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V 
2.0 Executive summary 
 
We distinguished five different stances regarding majorities’ (autochthonous people 
belonging to national majorities) attitudes towards minorities that have been proven to be 
cross-nationally as well as longitudinally comparable, and hence useful to answer our first 
general question on the prevalence of these different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism in 
EU member states. Other exclusionist stances appeared to be incomparable across nations 
and are therefore not included in the reports. 
 
• We discovered resistance to multicultural society, a view which was subscribed to 
by one in four Europeans living in member states, who constituted a rather stable 
minority over time (1997-2000-2003).  
• We ascertained the view that there are limits to multicultural society was 
supported by a growing majority of about two out of three Europeans living in 
member states. Three other attitudes refer directly to the influx and presence of 
minorities and legal migrants.  
• We ascertained a vast and, over time (1997-2000-2003), rather stable minority (of 
about four out of ten) that opposes civil rights for legal migrants.  
• We found a growing minority of about one out of five Europeans living in 
member states that is in favour of repatriation policies for legal migrants.  
• We found an over time growing majority of about two out of three Europeans that 
insists on the conformity of migrants to law. 
 
We found large differences between countries regarding these attitudes. Resistance to 
multicultural society and the view that there are limits to multicultural society is widely 
present in many countries in Western and Central Europe, whereas Nordic countries and 
Mediterranean countries, except for Greece, appear to disassociate themselves from these 
views.  
 
Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants is strongly present in countries in Western and 
Central Europe, and much less so in Mediterranean countries. People in Mediterranean as 
well as many Central European countries favour policies to repatriate migrants, which is 
much less common among Nordic citizens. Nordic people as well as many citizens living in 
Western and Central Europe insist on the conformity of minorities, whereas people in 
Mediterranean countries support this view much less.  
 
VI 
Let us turn to our second general question, i.e. on the prevalence of these dimensions 
within specific social categories for which we also found large and rather consistent 
differences between social categories across different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism.  
 
• We found that people who finished their educational career before or on their 
eighteenth birthday are more in favour of most of these dimensions of ethnic 
exclusionism than people with a prolonged educational career.  
 
We found this pattern time and again, however, with one exception: when it comes to 
insistence on the conformity to law, it turns out that the people with a prolonged 
educational career are more in favour of this view than people who finished their career 
earlier.  
 
• Regarding occupational categories, we found strikingly consistent patterns. Very 
often, people who are self-employed as well as manual workers strongly favour 
most of the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism which similarly also holds for 
people who depend on social security and for people who fulfil household tasks.  
 
Again, we found exceptions to this rule regarding insistence on conformity to law which 
turned out to be strongly subscribed to by (lower and higher) professionals.  
 
• Looking at the different income brackets, most dimensions of ethnic exclusionism 
are more strongly adhered to by the lowest income brackets, except for insistence 
on conformity to law which turned out to be somewhat more popular among the 
people in the highest bracket.  
• The older age categories, i.e. over 50s, appeared to favour all exclusionist stances 
more than average.  
• All dimensions of exclusionism were favoured more strongly in the countryside 
than in cities.  
• Finally, all dimensions of exclusionism were strongly subscribed to by people on 
the moderate or far right side of the political spectrum, except for insistence on 
conformity to law that was strongly supported by all except for the people who 
placed themselves on the far left. 
 
Turning to our third general question, on the spurious determinants of aspects of ethnic 
exclusionism, we found that most of the previously mentioned individual characteristics 
appeared to affect ethnic exclusionism except for the effect of income which turned out to 
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have merely minor and often non-significant effects. The effect of education turned out to 
be negative, also pertaining to insistence on conformity to law. Remarkably, we found some 
instances where gender differences,  previously ascertained to be non-significant in 
bivariate analyses, showed up as being significant: men turned out to be somewhat more 
resistant to multicultural society and to oppose civil rights for legal migrants.  
 
The answer to the fourth question on the contextual determinants is that only four of the 
effects of country characteristics turn out to be significant. The four significant effects are 
all in the expected direction.  
 
• The higher the level of unemployment in a country (in the year before the survey 
data were collected), the stronger the resistance to multicultural society and the 
stronger the support for repatriation policies.  
• In countries where the proportion of non-Western non-nationals is higher and 
where the GDP per capita is lower, resistance to multicultural society is stronger. 
 

  
2 Majorities’ attitudes towards minorities in European 
Union Member States 
 
Based on our conceptual analysis of exclusionist stances (see Report 1), we have 
distinguished five dimensions of majorities’ attitudes that have been shown to be cross-
nationally and longitudinally comparable (see Technical Appendix 3 to this report). These 
five dimensions consist of eleven items. Other items turned out to be cross-nationally 
incomparable. Therefore, we have decided not to include these particular items in the 
reports. We have used the cross-nationally comparable items to calculate index scores for 
Europeans living in member states on the distinguished five dimensions of ethnic 
exclusionism for comparative purposes. 
 
Next to the grand means of the index scores we present percentages of Europeans living in 
member states who favour a particular stance. Appendix 6 contains the numeric information 
as well as the calculation procedures. A comparison of these scores in EU member states 
tells us that there are considerable differences between these dimensions.  
 
Five ‘dimensions’ of ethnic exclusionism 
Overview 1: grand mean scores on dimensions of majority population’s attitudes  
 mean % support 
Resistance to multicultural society 0.37 25 
Limits to multicultural society 0.70 60 
Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants 0.41 39 
Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants 0.35 22 
Insistence on conformity to law 0.78 67 
 
Overview 1 shows that a vast majority of Europeans living in member states (67%) strongly 
insist on conformity to law (EU mean=.78) and a similar majority (60%) takes the view that 
the limits of multicultural society have been reached (grand mean=.70). There is somewhat 
less opposition to the granting of civil rights to legal migrants (39%) and less resistance to 
multicultural society (25%). We find the lowest mean score for the scale that measures a 
view that favours the repatriation of legal migrants, implying that 22% of Europeans living 
in member states favour these (rather drastic) policies.     
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2.1 Comparisons between Member States:  
descriptive analyses 
 
Let us now take a look at the differences between member states.1 This relates to our first 
general question introduced in Report 1:  
 
We have performed analyses of variance to calculate these differences between the means 
of the countries. These differences generally reach significance levels, which is, given the 
number of respondents, no surprise at all. We have depicted these differences in graphs for 
visual purposes. Appendix 6 contains more specific numeric information. Member states 
have been ordered geographically, from north to south.  
 
2.1.1 Resistance to multicultural society 
 
Let us take a look at the cross-national differences regarding resistance to multicultural 
society which are presented in Figure 1. This view implies that people oppose cultural, 
ethnic and religious diversity as an enrichment for society as a whole. 
 
Figure 1: mean scores resistance to multicultural society 
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This figure shows that some countries are above the EU mean: Greece, Germany (East and 
West), Belgium and Austria. Italy has the same mean score the EU has. All other countries 
                                                          
1 For country codes see appendix 1. 
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(Nordic and some Mediterranean countries alike) are quite below this grand mean. Ireland 
and Northern Ireland have the lowest means of the EU member states. 
 
2.1.2 Limits to multicultural society 
 
Many more Europeans living in member states feel that there are limits to multicultural 
society than expressed by the grand mean: a vast majority feels that their country has 
reached the limits of cultural or ethnic diversity. Let us take a look at the differences across 
countries. 
 
Figure 2: mean scores on limits to multicultural society 
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We find a number of countries in which people feel that there are limits to multicultural 
society: Greece is (again) on top, followed by Germany (East and West), Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Great Britain, Austria, France and Portugal. Well 
below the EU mean are Northern Ireland, Spain, Italy and the Nordic countries like 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland. 
 
2.1.3  Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants 
 
Opposition to civil rights for legally administered residents is less widespread in the EU. 
Some people oppose the granting of civil rights to legal immigrants similar to those other 
legal residents have. For country differences see Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: mean scores on opposition to civil rights 
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This figure reveals that this kind of opposition is rather strong in Belgium, followed by 
Germany (East and West), Great Britain and Austria, whereas Denmark, Finland and 
France are just above the EU mean. Well below the EU mean are the Mediterranean 
countries like Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, but also Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
 
2.1.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants 
 
One step further than opposing civil rights for legal migrants is to favour policies to 
repatriate these legal migrants, particularly when these migrants are unemployed. Figure 4 
presents the mean scores on these policies. 
 
We find (again) that about half of the Greeks strongly favour this kind of policy, followed 
by people from Portugal, Austria, Germany (East and West), Ireland, Italy, Spain and 
France. The Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden and Denmark) are much less in favour of 
such policies than the people living in Northern Ireland and the Netherlands. 
Standard Eurobarometers 1997-2000-2003 5 
 
 
 
Figure 4: mean scores on favour repatriation policies 
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2.1.5 Insistence on conformity of migrants to law  
 
Let us take a look at the stance that so many Europeans living in member states appear to 
agree upon: insistence on migrants’ conformity to law and conventions. 
 
Figure 5: mean scores on insistence on conformity to law 
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This figure shows us that particularly people living in the Nordic countries insist on 
conformity to law: people from Denmark, Sweden and Finland, followed by people in 
Western Europe like from the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany (East and West). Well 
below the grand EU mean are people living in some of the Mediterranean countries such as 
Portugal, Italy and Greece, but also people living in Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
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2.2 Comparisons between social categories: 
descriptive analyses 
 
After this (bivariate) description of country differences, we will proceed with analyses of 
the differences between social categories regarding the majority’s attitudes to minorities 
and migrants. We follow these procedures to answer our second general question:  
 
4)  Which particular social categories of the general public support these different 
dimensions of ethnic exclusionism? 
 
Again, we have performed analyses of variance to calculate the differences between these 
categories. Many differences between social categories have proven to reach significance, 
except for gender. Since we have found no statistically significant differences at all between 
men and women, we will not include this characteristic in the visual results.  
 
2.2.1 Resistance to multicultural society 
 
Let us take a look at resistance to multicultural society (EU mean=.37). We will start with a 
closer look at the differences between educational categories, i.e. the age at which 
respondents have stopped their educational career. 
 
Figure 6 tells us that people who have stopped their educational career before or at the age 
of 18 resist multicultural society rather strongly whereas those who stopped their education 
after the age of 18 show far less resistance to multicultural society. This finding is in 
accordance with our hypothesis.2 
 
                                                          
2 Hypothesis 1: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of 
the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic ‘outgroups’, 
more particularly among: a) people with a low level of education. 
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Figure 6: resistance to multicultural society by education 
 
 
Figure 7: resistance to multicultural society by occupation 
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This figure shows us that particularly the self-employed resist multicultural society, but also 
the people who work in their own household and the retired. In support of our hypothesis 
GRAND MEAN
(.37)
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6-14 15-16 17-18 19-21 22+ still
studying
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we find that unskilled and skilled manual workers and, in support of hypothesis 1c3, 
unemployed people favour this view more than average, whereas white collar workers 
(higher and lower professionals and routine non-manual workers) dissociate themselves 
from this view.  
                                                          
3 Hypothesis 1: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of 
the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic ‘outgroups’, 
more particularly among: c) unemployed people. 
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Figure 8: resistance to multicultural society by income 
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Here we only find very minor differences between income brackets. However, we find, in 
accordance with our hypothesis 1d4, that the people in the lowest income quartile show 
more resistance. 
 
Figure 9: resistance to multicultural society by age 
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4 Hypothesis 1: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of 
the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic ‘outgroups’, 
more particularly among: d) people with a low income. 
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We find a more or less monotonic relationship between age and resistance to multicultural 
society: the older people are, the more resistance they show. There is, however, one 
exception to this finding: people in their thirties show somewhat more resistance than 
people in their forties. 
12 REPORT 2 
 
 
Figure 10: resistance to multicultural society by degree of urbanisation 
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This figure shows that people living in rural areas harbour more resistance than people 
living in large towns which actually refutes our hypothesis 1e5 in which we proposed that it 
would be the other way around. We will get back to this finding. 
 
Figure 11: resistance to multicultural society by political self placement 
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5 Hypothesis 1: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of 
the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic ‘outgroups’, 
more particularly among: e) people living in urban areas. 
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Figure 11 shows us that people who consider themselves to be on the moderate or far right 
wing harbour more resistance to multicultural society than people who place themselves on 
the far left of the political spectrum. People who consider themselves to be politically in the 
centre are actually in the middle, that is on the mean. People who refuse to place themselves 
politically hold similar views to those who consider themselves to be on the moderate right 
of the spectrum. 
 
2.2.2 Limits to multicultural society 
 
Let us take a look at the social categories that hold the view that the limits to multicultural 
society have been reached, a view that is supported by a majority of the general European 
population living in member states (EU mean=.70). 
 
We find a similar pattern to the one found for resistance to multicultural society. People 
who have stopped their education at or of before the age of 18 take the view that 
multicultural society has reached its limits more than people who prolonged their 
educational career after the age of 18, who are less supportive of this view. 
 
Figure 12: limits to multicultural society by education 
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Figure 13: limits to multicultural society by occupation 
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We find that people who work in their household and the retired people strongly feel that 
multicultural society has reached its limits, followed by manual workers and self-employed 
people. Unemployed people are just above the grand mean. Professionals (lower and 
higher) and people performing routine non-manual work disassociate themselves from this 
view. This pattern is also quite similar to the pattern we found regarding resistance to 
multicultural society. 
 
Figure 14: limits to multicultural society by income 
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Once again, there are very minor differences between income categories. All income 
categories support this view more than the highest quartile income category. 
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Figure 15: limits to multicultural society by age 
GRAND MEAN
(.70)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+
 
Here we once again encounter a monotonic relationship between age categories and the 
view that multicultural society has reached its limits. People under 50 are below the grand 
mean whereas people over 50 years of age are considerably above the grand mean. 
 
Figure 16: limits to multicultural society by urbanisation 
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Once more, there are very minor differences between categories of urbanisation. People 
living in rural areas subscribe more to this view than people in large towns. 
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Figure 17: limits to multicultural society by political self placement 
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Except for the people who consider themselves to belong to the (far or moderate) left, all 
others generally subscribe more than average to the view that multicultural society has 
reached its limits, including the people who refuse to scale themselves politically and the 
people who do not know where they stand politically. 
 
2.2.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants 
 
Now, let us turn to the opposition to civil rights for legal migrants comparable to the civil 
rights that national citizens (already) have. Previously, we reported that a vast minority of 
the general European public living in member states wished to deny such civil rights to 
legal migrants (EU mean=.41). 
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Figure 18: opposition to civil rights by education 
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This diagram differs somewhat from the ones we have already described. Only among 
people who prolonged their educational career after the age of 22 and among those still 
studying do we find less opposition to granting these civil rights whereas all other 
educational categories are more opposed than the average. The score of people who 
finished their education between 19 and 21 is very similar to the grand mean. 
 
We find that skilled and unskilled manual workers oppose civil rights for legal migrants 
more than in general which also holds true for people who depend on social security like 
unemployed and retired people. Professionals (both higher and lower) as well as students 
appear to disassociate themselves from this view. 
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Figure 19: opposition to civil rights by occupation 
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Figure 20: opposition to civil rights by income 
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We find hardly any differences between income brackets. The people in the lowest income 
quartile oppose  the granting of civil rights to legal migrants a little more than the others. 
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Figure 21: opposition to civil rights by age 
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Again, we find a monotonic relationship between age and this aspect of the majority’s 
attitudes: the older people are, the more they oppose the granting of civil rights to legal 
migrants. Only among people in their teens and twenties, do we find somewhat less 
opposition. 
 
Figure 22: opposition to civil rights by urbanisation 
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We have already ascertained minor differences between rural and urban areas regarding 
some attitudes to migrants and this finding turns out to be repeated. People living in rural 
villages are somewhat more opposed to civil rights for legal migrants than others. 
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Figure 23: opposition to civil rights by political self placement 
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People who consider themselves to be on the (moderate or far) right wing of the political 
spectrum oppose  civil rights for legal migrants rather strongly, more than people on the left 
wing. The scores of people who consider themselves to be in the centre of the political 
spectrum are similar to the grand mean which also holds for people who refuse to take a 
stand or who do not know their political standpoint. 
 
2.2.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants 
 
Now, we turn to a rather drastic policy measure that was subscribed to by a minority of the 
European public living in member states: the repatriation of legal migrants (EU mean=.35). 
 
Again, we find that those people who finished their educational career at or before the age 
of 18 are somewhat more in favour of repatriation policies, whereas people who enjoyed 
their education after this age support this view less.  
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Figure 24: favour repatriation policies by education 
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A quite similar pattern is revealed when we look at differences between occupational 
categories. Again, we find that skilled and unskilled manual workers but also the self-
employed people favour repatriation policies as well as people working in their household 
and people dependent on social security. Professionals (lower and higher) and routine non-
manuals disapprove of such policies. 
 
Figure 25: favour repatriation policies by occupation 
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Figure 26: favour repatriation policies by income 
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Again, we find minor differences between income brackets. People in the lowest quartile 
favour repatriation policies somewhat more than people in other income brackets. 
 
Figure 27: favour repatriation policies by age 
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People in their fifties, sixties and seventies favour repatriation policies more than younger 
age categories. 
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Figure 28: favour repatriation policies by urbanisation 
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People living in rural areas support repatriation policies more than people living in larger 
towns and cities. 
 
Figure 29: favour repatriation policies by political self placement 
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People placing themselves on the left wing of the political spectrum are less in favour of 
repatriation policies than all the other political categories. 
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2.2.5 Insistence on conformity of migrants to law  
 
Let us turn to the stance on which so many Europeans living in member states turn out to 
agree: a vast majority supports the view that minorities should conform to the host society 
they live in, in order to become fully accepted (EU mean=.78). 
 
Figure 30: insistence on conformity to law by education 
GRAND MEAN
(.78)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
6-14 15-16 17-18 19-21 22+ still
studying
 
Now, we find a pattern that deviates somewhat from the previous patterns where 
exclusionist stances were related to educational level. We find exceptionally minor 
differences between these educational categories. People who continued their education 
after the age of 22 are a bit more supportive of conformity to law than other categories. 
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Figure 31: insistence on conformity to law by occupation 
GRAND MEAN
(.78)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
hig
her
 pro
fes
sio
nal
s
low
er p
rofe
ssio
nal
s
rou
t. n
on-
ma
nua
ls
sel
f-em
plo
yed
sk.
 ma
nua
ls
uns
k. m
anu
als 
in h
ous
eho
ld
stu
den
t
une
mp
loy
ed
reti
red
/dis
abl
ed
 
Again, we find a dissimilar pattern to the ones we previously described for occupation. 
Although there are merely minor differences, we find that professionals who turned out to 
disassociate themselves from exclusionist stances are more in favour of conformity to law 
than self-employed people and people working in their household whom we often found to 
support exclusionist views. 
 
Figure 32: insistence on conformity to law by income 
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Although it is very difficult to ascertain differences between income brackets at all, we find 
that the highest quartile insists somewhat more on conformity to law than the other 
brackets. 
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Figure 33: insistence on conformity to law by age 
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This pattern resembles the pattern we described above: the older one is, the more one insists 
on conformity to law. 
 
Figure 34: insistence on conformity to law by urbanisation 
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People living in large towns turn out to insist somewhat less on conformity to law than 
people living in other areas. 
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Figure 35: insistence on conformity to law by political self placement 
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Again, we find a pattern that is dissimilar to the patterns we previously described for 
exclusionist stances. Only people who place themselves on the far left insist less on 
conformity to law than those in all the other political categories. People who refused to 
place themselves have similar positions to the people on the far left wing. 
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2.3 Comparisons between member states and social 
categories: multivariate multilevel analyses 
 
After this description of bivariate relationships between social categories answering our 
second general question, we set out to answer our third general question:  
 
4) Which social characteristics are spuriously related to (different dimensions of) 
ethnic exclusionism?  
 
Answers to these questions reveal which of the social characteristics have spurious 
relationships with (different dimensions of) ethnic exclusionism after controlling for each 
of the other social characteristics. Answers to these type of questions are useful to 
disentangle the direct effects on ethnic exclusionism of strongly associated characteristics 
like e.g. education, occupation and income that in previous paragraphs have all been shown 
to be related to variations in ethnic exclusionism. Simultaneously, we take the national 
context in which all of these people live into account, thereby answering our fourth and 
final general question:  
 
4) To what extent do particular national characteristics affect (dimensions of) ethnic 
exclusionism?  
 
For these purposes, we have executed multivariate multilevel analyses on each of the 
dimensions of ethnic exclusionism1. 
 
2.3.1 Resistance to multicultural society 
 
Let us start answering our third and fourth questions regarding the resistance to 
multicultural society. We started testing four respective models2. 
 
Table 1a: Different multi-level models on resistance to multicultural society in 15 
European countries (*=significant improvement of model fit) 
Models  -2*loglikelihood ∆-2*loglikelihood ∆df 
0 Intercept (Individual-level variation) 16529.2  
1 + random variation at country level 15527.1 1002.1* 1 
2 +individual characteristics 15024.5 502.6* 15 
3 +country characteristics 15008.3 16.2* 5 
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A comparison between Model 0 and Model 1 in this Table shows us that the variation 
between EU member states is strongly significant. Moreover, we can expect to find 
significant differences between social categories, as implied by a comparison between 
Model 1 and Model 2. Moreover, adding country characteristics to these previous models 
seems to have (significant) additional explanatory power. 
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Table 1b: Parameter estimates from multi-level models on resistance to multi-
cultural society in 15 European countries; standard errors in brackets 
(N=15096) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 0.36 (0.03) 0.33 (0.03) 0.34 (0.03) 
Individual characteristics    
Education  -0.11-1 (0.01-1) -0.11-1 (0.01-1) 
Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)    
Lower professionals  -0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) 
Routine non-manuals  0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
Self-employed people  0.06 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02) 
Skilled manuals  0.06 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02) 
Unskilled manuals  0.07 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02) 
Housewives   0.06 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02) 
Students  0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 
Unemployed people  0.06 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02) 
Retired people  0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 
Income  -1.50-3 (0.01) -1.50-3 (0.01) 
Age  7.50-3 (0.00) 7.50-3 (0.00) 
Gender: male (female = ref.)  0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
Urbanisation (rural area or village =ref.)    
Small or middle sized town  -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
Large sized town  -0.05 (0.01) -0.05 (0.01) 
Country characteristics    
Unemployment: 2002   0.11-1 (0.05-1) 
GDP: 2002   -0.95-2 (0.36-2) 
Non-Western non-nationals: % in 2000   0.26-1 (0.11-1) 
Immigration non-EU nationals: 1995-9   -0.16-2 (1.22-2) 
Asylum applications: 2001-2   -0.41-2 (1.59-2) 
Variance components    
Individual  0.16 0.16 0.16 
(Percentage explained)  (3.07) (3.07) 
Country 0.01 0.01 0.00 
(Percentage explained)  (2.03) (61.16) 
Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.05. 
 
The parameters presented under Model 2 in Table 1b tell us that the effect of education, 
controlled for all other individual characteristics, is negative: the longer people enjoy 
education, the less resistance to multicultural society they harbour. Regarding occupational 
categories, we find strong differences. As compared to the reference category (higher 
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professionals), it turns out that unskilled manual labourers, skilled labourers and self-
employed people have more resistance to multicultural society and this also holds true for 
housewives and people dependent on social security. Lower professionals, people 
performing routine non-manual work and students do not differ significantly from higher 
professionals in this respect. Next, we ascertained that the higher someone’s income, the 
less resistance to multicultural society they have. We find a slight positive effect for age: 
the older people are, the more strongly they resist multicultural society. Contrary to our 
bivariate analyses, we now find a difference between the sexes: males have more resistance 
than females. We also find that resistance to multicultural society is more strongly prevalent 
in the countryside as the parameter estimates for medium and large sized towns differ 
significantly from the reference category, i.e. rural villages. 
The lower part of the Table shows the explained variance of Model 2. The explanatory 
power of the individual characteristics is very limited. Together, they explain only 3 percent 
of the differences between individuals within countries. Due to composition effects, the 
individual characteristics explain 2 percent of the variance between countries. This implies 
that to a small extent, the observed differences between countries in the mean level of 
resistance to multicultural society can be attributed to differences in population 
composition.  
Even more interesting are the additional effects of country characteristics, presented in the 
column under Model 3. We find a significant effect for the level of unemployment rate in 
2002, the year before these data were collected: the higher the unemployment rate in the 
country, the more widespread resistance to multicultural society is in countries, which 
explains (at least some) country differences. We also find that the effect of the GDP is 
negative: the higher the country’s GDP, the lower resistance to multicultural society is. The 
effect of the presence of non-Western non-nationals is positive: the more of them live in the 
country, the higher resistance to multicultural society is. The effects of the other country 
characteristics do not reach significance. These country characteristics account for 61 
percent of the differences between countries. 
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2.3.2 Limits to multicultural society 
 
Now, we will focus on the view that limits to multicultural society have been reached. Let 
us have a look at the tables. 
 
Table 2a:  Different multi-level models on limits  to multicultural society in 15 
European countries (*=significant improvement of model fit) 
Models -2*loglikelihood ∆-2*loglikelihood ∆df 
0 Intercept (Individual-level variation) 15163.6   
1 + random variation at country level 13270.3 1893.3* 1 
2 +individual characteristics 12491.0 779.3* 15 
3 +country characteristics 12487.5 3.5 5 
 
The comparison between Model 1 and Model 0, allows us to deduce that the differences 
between countries are quite strong which also holds for differences between individuals, i.e. 
the comparison between Models 1 and 2. However, adding country characteristics to the 
equations appears to be futile. Let us look more specifically at the parameter estimates in 
Table 2b.  
 
Again, we find that the longer people were educated, the less they support the view that the 
limits to multicultural society have been reached. We find that some occupational 
categories differ significantly from the higher professionals like (unskilled and skilled) 
manual workers, self-employed people, but also housewives, the unemployed and retired 
people. People performing routine non-manual work also differ significantly from the 
higher professionals in supporting this view. The effects of income and gender do not reach 
significance. Age, again, has a slight positive effect. People living in large towns turn out to 
support this view significantly less than people in rural villages. However, we find that 
none of the country characteristics add to the explanation for holding this view: although 
most of these determinants, except for the unemployment rate, point in the direction that we 
expected, none of them reaches significance. 
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Table 2b:  Parameter estimates from multi-level models on limits to multicultural 
society in 15 European countries; standard errors in brackets (N=15096) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 0.70 (0.03) 0.65 (0.03) 0.65 (0.03) 
Individual characteristics    
Education  -0.95-2 (0.11-2) -0.95-2 (0.11-2) 
Occupation: (higher professionals=ref.)    
Lower professionals  0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 
Routine non-manuals  0.06 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 
Self-employed people  0.06 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02) 
Skilled manuals  0.09 (0.02) 0.09 (0.02) 
Unskilled manuals  0.09 (0.02) 0.09 (0.02) 
Housewives   0.07 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02) 
Students  -0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) 
Unemployed people  0.09 (0.02) 0.09 (0.02) 
Retired people  0.08 (0.02) 0.08 (0.02) 
Income  0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Age  1.90-3 (0.00) 1.90-3 (0.00) 
Gender: male (female=ref.)   0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Urbanisation (rural area or village=ref.)    
Small or middle sized town  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Large sized town  -0.04 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01) 
Country characteristics    
Unemployment: 2002   -0.00 (0.01) 
GDP: 2002   -0.01 (0.01) 
Non-Western non-nationals: % in 2000   0.01 (0.02) 
Immigration non-EU nationals: 1995-9   0.01 (0.02) 
Asylum applications: 2001-2   0.01 (0.03) 
Variance components    
Individual  0.14 0.13 0.13 
(Percentage explained)  (4.81) (4.81) 
Country 0.02 0.02 0.01 
(Percentage explained)  (9.08) (26.82) 
Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.05. 
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2.3.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants 
 
Previously, we ascertained that a minority of people living in EU member states oppose the 
granting of civil rights to legal migrants. Let us have a look at the significant differences 
between countries and categories of people. 
 
Table 3a:  Different multi-level models on opposition to civil rights in 15 European 
countries (*=significant improvement of model fit) 
Models -2*loglikelihood ∆-2*loglikelihood ∆df 
0 Intercept (Individual level variation) 13441.6   
1 + random variation at country level 12834.7 606.9* 1 
2 +individual characteristics 12457.0 377.7* 15 
3 +country characteristics 12449.5 7.5 5 
 
Table 3a tells us that we can expect major differences between countries as well as between 
social categories of people, but, again, we only see marginal additional explanatory power 
resulting from including country characteristics. 
In Table 3b we ascertain similar effects and differences between categories as described in 
previous paragraphs. The longer people have been exposed to the educational system, the 
less they oppose civil rights for legal migrants. Many occupational categories are more 
strongly opposed to civil rights than higher professionals, except for lower professionals 
and students. Regarding this aspect of exclusionism, we find no significant effects for 
income (again) and age. Males appear to oppose more strongly than females and this kind 
of opposition is far more widespread in the countryside than it is in medium or large sized 
towns. However, we actually find that none of the country characteristics contribute 
significantly to the explanation of the variation in opposition to granting civil rights. All of 
the effects of the characteristics we proposed are in the direction we had expected. As yet, 
since these contributions do not reach significance, we refrain from attaching too much 
scientific value to the latter findings. 
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Table 3b: Parameter estimates from multi-level models on the opposition to civil 
rights in 15 European countries; standard errors in brackets (N=15096) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 0.40 (0.02) 0.38 (0.02) 0.38 (0.02) 
Individual characteristics    
Education  -0.85-2  (0.14-2) -0.85-2 (0.14-2) 
Occupation: (higher professionals =ref.)    
Lower professionals  0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 
Routine non-manuals  0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 
Self-employed people  0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 
Skilled manuals  0.06 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02) 
Unskilled manuals  0.08 (0.02) 0.08 (0.02) 
Housewives   0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 
Students  -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Unemployed people  0.06 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02) 
Retired people  0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 
Income  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Age  6.60-4 (0.00) 6.60-4 (0.00) 
Gender: male (female=ref.)   0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
Urbanisation: (rural area or village =ref.)    
Small or middle sized town  -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
Large sized town  -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) 
Country characteristics    
Unemployment: 2002   0.01 (0.01) 
GDP: 2002   -0.00 (0.00) 
Non-Western non-nationals:  % in 2000   0.01 (0.01) 
Immigration non-EU nationals: 1995-9   0.02 (0.01) 
Asylum applications: 2001-2   0.01 (0.02) 
Variance components    
Individual  0.14 0.13 0.13 
(Percentage explained)  (2.34) (2.34) 
Country 0.01 0.01 0.00 
(Percentage explained)  (0.00) (22.67) 
Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.05, Italic parameters indicate significance at 
 p < 0.10. 
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2.3.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants 
 
Let us turn to the (harsh) policies of sending back legal migrants, i.e. policies that turned 
out to be favoured by a minority of the people living in EU member states.  
 
Table 4a: Different multi-level models of in favour of repatriation policies in 15 
European countries (*=significant improvement of model fit) 
Models -
2*loglikelihood
∆-2*loglikelihood ∆df 
0 Intercept (Individual-level 
variation) 
15408.9  
1 + random variation at country level 14325.4 1083.5* 1 
2 +individual characteristics 13803.2 522.2* 15 
3 +country characteristics 13799.9 3.3 5 
 
In Table 4a the same picture emerges: large differences between countries and between 
categories of people, but only marginal additional explanatory power for the country 
characteristics. 
In Table 4b we ascertain somewhat less significant effects than in previous comparable 
tables. Again, we find a negative effect for education, in this Table for support for 
repatriation policies. Once again, we ascertain that (skilled and unskilled) manual labourers 
and housewives differ from the higher professionals. Yet, the differences between self-
employed people and unemployed people, on the one hand, and higher professionals on the 
other, barely reach significance in this case. The other individual characteristics do not 
reach significance either. Inclusion of these individual characteristics shows that differences 
between countries are partly due to differences in the composition of the samples, as can be 
derived from the percentage of explained variance in Model 2. 
When we turn to the effects of the national characteristics, we find an unemployment effect: 
the higher the unemployment was in the year before data collection, the higher the support 
for repatriation policies. This finding may at least partially explain the relatively high levels 
of support for this type of policy in the Mediterranean countries as well as in Eastern 
Germany. The other characteristics are not significantly related to a favourable stance on 
repatriation policies. 
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Table 4b:     Parameter estimates from multi-level models on in favour of repatriation 
policies in 15 European countries; standard errors in brackets (N=15096) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 0.35 (0.02) 0.33 (0.03) 0.34 (0.03) 
Individual characteristics    
Education  -0.12-1 (0.01-1) -0.12-1 (0.01-1) 
Occupation: (higher professionals =ref.)    
Lower professionals  -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Routine non-manuals  0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 
Self-employed people  0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 
Skilled manuals  0.06 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02) 
Unskilled manuals  0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 
Housewives   0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 
Students  -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
Unemployed people  0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 
Retired people  0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 
Income  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Age  0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Gender: male (female=ref.)   0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Urbanisation: (rural area or village 
=ref.) 
   
Small or middle sized town  -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Large sized town  -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Country characteristics    
Unemployment: 2002   0.81-2 (0.46-2) 
GDP: 2002   -0.00 (0.00) 
Non-Western non-nationals: % in 2000   0.01 (0.01) 
Immigration non-EU nationals: 1995-9   -0.00 (0.01) 
Asylum applications: 2001-2   0.00 (0.02) 
Variance components    
Individual  0.15 0.15 0.15 
(Percentage explained)  (3.18) (3.18) 
Country 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(Percentage explained)  (35.60) (46.92) 
Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.05, Italic parameters indicate significance at p 
< 0.10. 
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2.3.5 Insistence on conformity of migrants to law  
 
Finally, let us turn to the insistence on conformity to law, a view that is apparently 
supported by a strong majority of the people living in EU member states.  
 
Table 5a: Different multi-level models on  insistence on conformity to law in 15 
European countries (*=significant improvement of model fit) 
Models -2*loglikelihood ∆-2*loglikelihood ∆df 
0 Intercept (Individual-level variation) 10801.9   
1 + random variation at country level 9398.5 1403.4* 1 
2 +individual characteristics 9269.8 128.7* 15 
3 +country characteristics 9268.0 1.8 5 
 
Table 5a Model 3, once again informs us not to expect major effects of country 
characteristics although differences between countries are highly significant which also 
holds for differences between social categories. 
In Table 5b, we ascertain the reoccurring effect of education, yet, this effect is much 
smaller than in previous analyses. However, looking at the occupational categories, quite a 
different picture emerges. None of the occupational categories differ from the higher 
professionals, except for students, which implies actually that all of these categories 
essentially agree on the insistence on conformity of migrants to law. Moreover, we find a 
slight positive effect of income: the higher one’s income, the more one insists on 
conformity to law. We also find a positive effect for age, which we have found previously. 
As yet, none of the effects related to country characteristics turn out to reach significance. 
Yet, we would once again like to mention that all of the effects are in the direction we 
proposed. 
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Table 5b:     Parameter estimates from multi-level models on insistence on conformity 
to law  in 15 European countries; standard errors in brackets (N=15096) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 0.77 (0.02) 0.79 (0.03) 0.79 (0.03) 
Individual characteristics    
Education  -2.70-3 (0.00) -2.70-3 (0.00) 
Occupation: (higher professionals =ref.)    
Lower professionals  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Routine non-manuals  -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
Self-employed people  -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
Skilled manuals  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Unskilled manuals  -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Housewives   -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Students  -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) 
Unemployed people  -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
Retired people  -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Income  0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
Age  1.30-3 (0.00) 1.30-3 (0.00) 
Gender: male (female=ref.)   0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Urbanisation: (rural area or village =ref.)    
Small or middle sized town  0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Large sized town  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Country characteristics    
Unemployment: 2002   0.00 (0.01) 
GDP: 2002   -0.00 (0.00) 
Non-Western non-nationals: % in 2000   0.00 (0.01) 
Immigration non-EU nationals: 1995-9   0.01 (0.02) 
Asylum applications: 2001-2   0.02 (0.02) 
Variance components    
Individual  0.11 0.11 0.11 
(Percentage explained)  (0.83) (0.83) 
Country 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(Percentage explained)  (1.09) (6.84) 
Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.05. 
 
More in general, when we look at the explained variance of the various dimensions of 
ethnic exclusionism, we have to emphasise that the effects of individual characteristics and 
consequently the percentage of explained variance at the individual level are rather modest, 
varying between .83 and 4.81%. Differences between countries due to different 
compositions also do not explain much of the variation in ethnic exclusionism, except for 
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the support for repatriation policies. Although many of the country characteristics do not 
reach significance, the amount of explained variance at the contextual level is less modest. 
When it comes to the significance of effects, we find that unemployment in the year before 
the data were collected affects the level of ethnic exclusionism, i.e. on resistance to 
multicultural society and support for repatriation policies, in EU countries. The presence of 
non-Western nationals appears to increase resistance to multicultural society. The effects of 
the GDP are rather consistently negative, but do not reach significance in any instance of 
ethnic exclusionism. 
 
2.3.6 Evaluation of hypotheses 
 
After this description of the results of the multilevel analyses, we turn to the evaluation of 
hypotheses we previously derived from theories on ethnic exclusionism. Regarding 
individual conditions, we proposed to test hypotheses on the social position of members of 
majorities: those social categories who hold similar positions to those of ethnic outgroups 
were considered to support ethnic exclusionism more strongly than people in more 
privileged social positions. First, we actually found that people who had finished their 
educational career young generally support many stances related to ethnic exclusionism. 
This supports Hypothesis 1a on higher levels of ethnic exclusionism among people with a 
low level of education. Secondly, we ascertained that people performing (skilled or 
unskilled) manual labour rather strongly favoured exclusionist stances, which supports 
Hypothesis 1b on higher levels of ethnic exclusionism among manual workers. The same 
pattern also held for Hypothesis 1c on the unemployed. We had not formulated hypotheses 
on the position of the self-employed who we quite consistently found to support dimensions 
of ethnic exclusionism which also hold for housewives. In relation to hypothesis 1d we 
found merely rather weak effects of the actual level of income. The results show that these 
effects become spurious after including education and occupation, that is, someone’s 
resources and positions on or close to the labour market. These results generally corroborate 
hypotheses on individual characteristics derived from Ethnic Competition Theory, 
pertaining to the level of ethnic exclusionism in the less privileged social strata. There is, 
however, one exception regarding the insistence on conformity to law: we only found non-
significant differences between occupational categories, but as yet a significant positive 
effect of income, implying that people with high incomes insist more strongly on this type 
of conformity for migrants. Hypothesis 1e regarding support for ethnic exclusionism among 
people living in urban areas was refuted altogether: instead we found that people living in 
the countryside support various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism more than people living 
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in cities do. These findings imply that living close to minorities or even having 
(opportunities for) contacts with minorities, may reduce ethnic exclusionism. 
Regarding contextual conditions, we proposed to test hypotheses on the economic and 
demographic situation of the countries involved. We found some support for the effects of 
the presence of non-Western non-nationals in just one of the five dimensions: it can be 
suggested that the more non-western non-nationals living in a country, the more resistance 
to multicultural society. This partially supports Hypothesis 3a. 6 Other instances of ethnic 
exclusionism were also positively affected by the presence of non-Western nationals, 
however, these effects did not reach significance. We also found some support for 
Hypothesis 3d7 on unemployment: the higher the level of unemployment in the year 2002, 
i.e. before data collection, the more widespread resistance to multicultural society and the 
more widespread support for repatriation policies was. The effects of the GDP, referred to 
in Hypothesis 4b8, appeared to be consistently negative but reached significance only with 
respect to resistance to multicultural society. Although we found that the effects proposed 
in the other hypotheses were quite often in the direction we had postulated, they did not 
turn out to reach significance levels. As far as there are significant effects for country 
characteristics, they indicate that ethnic exclusionism is stronger in countries with a higher 
level of ethnic competition which is in line with Ethnic Competition Theory. In particular, 
resistance to multicultural society is stronger in countries with a higher level of ethnic 
competition, as indicated by a relatively high level of unemployment, a relatively low GDP 
per capita and a relatively high proportion of non-Western non-nationals. 
 
                                                          
6 Hypothesis 3: Ethnic exclusionism will be stronger in countries where the actual level of 
ethnic competition is relatively high, more particularly in contextual conditions of: a) a 
relatively high proportion of resident migrants. 
7 Hypothesis 3: Ethnic exclusionism will be stronger in countries where the actual level of 
ethnic competition is relatively high, more particularly in contextual conditions of: d) a high 
proportion of unemployment. 
8 Hypothesis 4: ethnic exclusionism will be high in contextual conditions where: b) the 
GDP is relatively low, so that economic prosperity cannot serve to soften or even reduce 
possible effects of actual levels of ethnic competition. 
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2.4 Comparisons over time within Member States: 
descriptive analyses 
 
We have performed analyses of variance to calculate the mean scores for each country for 
each time period, i.e. each year of data collection. We will show these mean scores as 
deviations from the grand mean calculated for the Europeans living in member states as 
presented in Paragraph 1.1. We have also calculated whether the differences over time are 
significant. These tables are included in Appendix 7 to this report. If relevant, we will 
report on the significant developments in separate countries. 
 
2.4.1 Resistance to multicultural society 
 
Let us have a look at the resistance to multicultural society of which the general mean 
turned out to be .37 in 2003. Let us start with the countries with higher means than the 
general mean.  
 
Figure 36: longitudinal changes per country 
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In Figure 36 we can ascertain that resistance to multicultural society has been growing 
(significantly) in Greece over the last 6 years which does not hold for Germany (East and 
West) and Austria where the general mean has not (significantly) changed over time. In 
Belgium, resistance to multicultural society has (significantly) decreased. In some countries 
well below the grand mean, we see that the mean scores have dropped (significantly) as in 
some Nordic countries (Sweden and Denmark). In some Mediterranean countries (Spain 
and Portugal) the scores have gone up (though non-significantly). In countries such as Great 
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Britain and the Netherlands, the overall increase in support is significant. Overall, 
resistance to multicultural society has remained rather stable as a result of a general 
increase between 1997 and 2000 and a general decrease between 2000 and 2003.  
 
2.4.2 Limits to multicultural society 
 
Let us have a look at the view that the limits to multicultural society have been reached 
which turned out to be widely shared by Europeans living in member states. 
 
Figure 37: longitudinal changes per country 
(.70)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
FI SE DK GB NI
E IE NL BE LU
DE
W
DE
E
AT FR ES PT IT GR
1997 2000 2003 2003 EU GRAND MEAN 
 
 
In many countries well above the grand mean of 2003, there have been minor yet 
significant fluctuations: Greece, Germany (East and West), the Netherlands and Great 
Britain appear to have had these high scores for some time already. In other countries, the 
view that multicultural society has reached its limits has become more widespread, as it has 
in Ireland and Northern Ireland, but also in some Mediterranean countries (Spain and 
Portugal). In some Nordic countries (Sweden and Denmark), this view has become 
significantly less widely held. Overall, the majority of Europeans living in member states 
who hold this view appears to be growing significantly. 
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2.4.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants 
 
Now let us turn to the opposition to civil rights for legal migrants.  
 
Figure 38: longitudinal changes per country 
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Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants is relatively widespread and rather stable over 
the period 1997-2003 in countries such as Belgium, Great Britain and Austria, but 
decreased somewhat in the Netherlands and Germany between 2000 and 2003. In other 
countries where this kind of opposition has been rather low, it has remained so as it has in 
Northern Ireland and Ireland. Significant increases have taken place in Finland, Spain and 
Greece. Significant decreases have been observed in Sweden and Denmark. Overall, this 
view has remained rather stable as a result of a general increase between 1997 and 2000 
followed by a decrease between 2000 and 2003. 
 
2.4.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants 
 
Now let us turn to the policy measure that turned out to be the least favoured by Europeans 
living in member states: the repatriation of legal migrants. 
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Figure 39: longitudinal changes per country 
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Figure 39 shows us that the favourability of repatriation has grown significantly in many 
countries and has reached high levels in the Mediterranean countries, except for Italy where 
it has remained stable over time, and in countries in Western Europe, such as France and 
Austria, whereas it has remained stable over time in Germany. This view has also become 
significantly more popular in the Netherlands, Great Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland. 
In the Nordic countries, this view was adhered to by a rather small minority that has 
remained quite stable over time, except for Denmark. Overall, the minority of Europeans 
living in member states holding this view has grown significantly over time. 
 
2.4.5 Insistence on conformity of migrants to law  
 
Let us finally have a look at the view that is widely subscribed to by Europeans living in 
member states: the insistence on conformity to law of migrants. We would like to 
emphasise that there is a minor deviation between the results reported here compared to the 
results presented in Paragraph 1.1.5 which is due to the absence of measurement (v6) on the 
insistent view that minorities should give up particular religious and cultural practices that 
was absent from  the 1997 and 2000 data collections. Therefore, we only present findings 
on the item (v5) containing the view that minorities should give up their religion or culture 
which may be in conflict with the national law. 
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Figure 40: longitudinal changes per country 
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This rather popular view has become significantly more widespread in most European 
member states over the period 1997-2003, in countries in Western Europe (such as 
Belgium, Germany and Austria) except for the Netherlands where it had already become 
widespread in 1997 and has remained stable since then. In all other countries where this 
view was relatively unpopular in 1997, such as in the Mediterranean countries, but also in 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, it has become significantly more widespread over the past 
few years. Overall, the majority of Europeans living in member states supporting insistence 
on conformity to law has grown significantly. 
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Notes  
                                                          
1  We used multi-level analysis that allows simultaneous modelling of individual-level and country-
level effects and their interactions (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). To model these effects we used the 
software programme ML-wiN (Goldstein 1995). Multi-level modelling enables to ascertain which 
part of the variation in the individual dependent variable is explained by country-level effects, and 
which part of the variance by individual-level effects. As the structure of the data is such that 
individuals are nested within countries (individuals are level 1 and countries level 2 units in the 
analysis), neglecting the error terms at level 2 underestimates standard errors of the parameters. This 
in turn could lead to incorrect confirmation of hypotheses and hence to wrong answers to research 
questions. 
2 We started testing models. Goodness-of-fit statistics (-2*loglikelihood) of the different models are 
presented in the top of the tables (1a, 2a, 3a, 4a and 5a). Improvements in model fit are indicated by 
the difference (with the Greek letter ∆) in the loglikelihood statistic, which follows a Chi-square 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters to be estimated. Significant 
improvements in model fit are denoted with an asterix (*). We began by estimating a model, 
including an intercept with only individual-level variation. Next we estimated a model that also 
incorporates country-level variation in the intercept (model 1). Then we included all independent 
individual characteristics (like education and income) in our model (model 2). Finally, we included 
country characteristics in the model (3). We centred all individual-level variables (except for the 
dummy variables) by the overall mean across all countries. The parameter estimates accompanying 
the dummy variables, i.e. the different social categories of occupation or urbanisation, have to be 
compared to the so-called reference category to ascertain if and in which direction a particular 
category, i.e. skilled manual workers, differs significantly from the reference category, i.e. higher 
professionals, with respect to a particular dimension of ethnic exclusionism (Hardy, 1993). By 
including the individual variables in the model we can determine to what extent compositional 
differences between countries explain country-level variation in ethnic exclusionism. To test the 
effects on country-level effects we subsequently entered contextual characteristics into the multilevel 
model.  
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Appendix 1. List of countries and abbreviations 
 
In the report’s figures ISO 3166-1-Alpha-2 codes are used to present the various European 
countries (International Organisation for Standardisation, 2004). These codes are listed 
below in geographical order from North to South and from West to East. To these standard 
codes we added Northern Ireland (NIE), Germany West (DEW) and Germany East (DEE). 
Countries are geographically distinguished (N=Nordic countries, W=Western European 
countries, C=Central European countries, M=Mediterranean countries).   
 
Country Code  
Finland FI N 
Sweden SE N 
Denmark DK N 
Great Britain GB W 
Northern Ireland NIE W 
Ireland IE W 
Netherlands NL W 
Belgium BE W 
Luxembourg LU W 
Germany (West) DEW C 
Germany (East) DEE C 
Austria AT C 
France FR W 
Spain ES M 
Portugal PT M 
Italy IT M 
Greece GR M 
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Appendix 2. Data collection 
 
The standard Eurobarometer 59.2 was collected in May and June 2003, carried out by the 
European Opinion Research Group, on request of the European Commission, Directorate – 
General Press and Communication, Public Opinion Analysis Unit. 
We used  samples in 17 areas in 15 countries. The samples of Norway and Iceland were not 
taken into account in our analyses. Separate samples were drawn for Northern Ireland and 
for East and West Germany, hence we analysed these separately in our (multilevel) 
analyses. Each target sample was 1000 interviews, except for Northern Ireland (300) and 
Luxembourg (600). Regarding the sampling method the European Opinion Research Group 
(2003) provides the following information: 
‘Standard Eurobarometer surveys cover the population of the respective nationalities of the 
European Union member states, aged 15 years and over, resident in each of the member 
states. The basic sample design applied in all member states is a multi-stage, random 
(probability) one. In each EU country, a number of sampling points are drawn with 
probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to 
population density. 
For doing so, points are drawn systematically from each of the ‘administrative regional 
units’, after stratification by individual unit and type of area. Hence, they represent the 
whole territory of member states according to EUROSTAT NUTS 2 (or equivalent) and 
according to the distribution of resident population of the respective EU nationalities in 
terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of the selected sampling points, a 
starting address is drawn at random. Further addresses are selected as every Nth address by 
standard random route procedures, from the initial address. In each household, a respondent 
is drawn at random. All interviews are face-to-face in the respondent's home and in the 
appropriate national language.’ 
The provided fieldwork control report from the Standard Eurobarometer shows that the 
response rate varies from a low 27% in Great Britain to a rather high 88% in France (see 
Table A2.2.1). Note that figures on Luxembourg are lacking. 
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Table A2.2.1: Number of completed interviews and response rate by country: EB 
59.2. 
 Total number of 
completed 
interviews 
Response rate EU population aged 
15+ 
(x 1,000) 
Finland 1022 43% 4,165
Sweden 1000 46% 7,183
Denmark 1000 33% 4,338
Great Britain 1012 27% 46,077
Northern Ireland 300 41% 1,273
Ireland 1004 34% 2,980
Netherlands 1001 46% 12,705
Belgium 1051 51% 8,326
Luxembourg not available not available 364
Germany – West 1014 77% 55,782
Germany – East 1024 77% 13,028
Austria 1029 63% 6,668
France 1110 88% 46,945
Spain 1000 73% 33,024
Portugal 1000 67% 8,217
Italy 1013 61% 49,017
Greece 998 42% 8,793
 
2.1 Weighting 
 
For each Standard Eurobarometer survey, weights are constructed by the European Opinion 
Research Group, based on a comparison of the sample with population statistics from 
Eurostat. For each sample, a weighting procedure was carried out, using marginal and 
intercellular weighting, to adjust to distributions of gender, age and NUTS 2 region. From 
Eurobarometer 55 onwards, the weights to adjust to standard sample size of 1000 
interviews (600 for Luxembourg and 300 for Northern Ireland) were dropped from the 
delivered weights with the Eurobarometer data set. Therefore, we constructed such a weight 
ourselves, using the variable w1 (wsample; weight result from target). In multilevel 
analyses, the individual level weight (w1) and country weight (to adjust all countries to the 
same standard sample size) are separated from each other into two different weights, though 
having the equal impact. 
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2.2 Selection of majority population 
 
In the standard Eurobarometer, only respondents that had a nationality of one of the 
member states (in 2003) were interviewed. So, non-EU non-nationals were not taken into 
account (e.g. Turks with a Turkish nationality living in Germany were dropped from the 
sample). As the reports are intended to describe the majorities’ attitudes of each region or 
country, we decided to select only those respondents with the nationality of the respective 
country. In most samples less than 2% of the respondents had an EU-member nationality 
other than the country where the sample was drawn from. Only for Luxembourg a large 
number of respondents was dropped from the analyses, because of the chosen selection 
(24.2%). For Belgium the percentage of EU non-nationals was second highest with 5.4%. 
 
2.3 Missing value treatment 
 
We selected respondents based on their valid scores on the dependent variables. We first 
tested whether the items referring to ethnic exclusionism can be regarded as valid, reliable 
and cross-national comparable measurements. In these analyses, as extensively described in 
appendix 3, we only included respondents that answered all 11 items. Respondents with 
missing answers on one or more of the 11 items were excluded from these analyses.  
Having assessed that these 11 items indeed form a cross-national comparable measurement 
for various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, we treated respondents with missing 
answers as follows. In order to avoid severe reductions in the numbers of respondents, we 
performed a well-considered procedure previously used and published in scientific journals. 
From the 11 items on exclusionist stances, we took the criterion that at least 6 out of the 11 
items should have been answered. This leads to an acceptable selection of approximately 
96% of the respondents. It was only slightly less in Germany East, Austria and Ireland, and 
somewhat higher in Sweden, Luxembourg and Denmark. 
Missing values of respondents, providing that they had answered more than half of the 
items, were replaced by missing value substitution based on regression estimation. As the 
items correlated positively with each other (as expected), we regressed an item on all ten 
other items referring to exclusionist stances. In this manner, a missing score of a respondent 
on a particular item referring to ethnic exclusionism was replaced by an estimate based on 
the answers that this respondent provided on the other items referring to ethnic 
exclusionism. Finally, substituted values were rounded into the valid values of the original 
item. 
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Table A2.2.2 Percentages of respondents with missing values on the measurement 
of the dependent variables, percentages of respondents with 5 
missings or less (which were substituted) and percentage of 
respondents with no missing value. 
 % respondents with 
6 or more missing 
values (dropped from 
analyses) 
% of respondents 
with 1 to 5 missing 
values 
% respondents with 
no missing values 
Finland 3.6 38.6 57.8 
Sweden 1.6 35.5 62.9 
Denmark 1.2 44.2 54.6 
Great Britain 5.3 48.4 46.3 
Northern Ireland 3.3 49.3 47.4 
Ireland 7.2 49.9 42.9 
Netherlands 2.0 38.2 59.8 
Belgium 4.7 37.6 57.7 
Luxembourg 1.5 40.7 57.8 
Germany – West 4.5 51.7 43.8 
Germany – East 7.4 46.3 46.3 
Austria 7.3 41.1 51.6 
France 4.5 38.7 56.8 
Spain 6.6 51.6 41.8 
Portugal 4.1 53.3 42.6 
Italy 4.2 50.4 45.4 
Greece 2.4 34.3 63.3 
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Appendix 3. Measurements of ethnic exclusionism 
 
The Eurobarometer surveys provide measurements of most of the phenomena described in 
Report I. The questionnaire of 2003 contains a set of questions regarding attitudes toward 
migrants and minorities. However, not all of these items can be regarded as valid, reliable, 
and cross-national comparable indicators of exclusionist stances. In section 3.6 we explicate 
why some of these items were excluded from our analysis. We focused on a set of 11 items 
covering exclusionist stances. In Figures 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 we present which particular  
dimensions of ethnic exclusionism are theoretically expected to be measured by the items. 
This conceptualisation of items and dimensions builds on the conceptual analysis provided 
in Report 1. 
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Figure 2.3.1 Theoretical measurement model 
‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’ and
‘limits to multicultural society’ 
v1: It is a good thing for any society to be made up of 
people from different races, religions or cultures 
(reversed coding) 
v3: (COUNTRY)'s diversity in terms of race, religion 
or culture adds to its strengths (reversed coding) 
v6: In order to be fully accepted members of 
(NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these 
minority groups must give up religious or cultural 
practices such as polygamy or female circumcision 
v5: In order to be fully accepted members of 
(NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these 
minority groups must give up such parts of their 
religion or culture which may be in conflict with 
(NATIONALITY) law 
v9: (OUR COUNTRY) has reached its limits; if there 
were to be more people belonging to these minority 
groups we would have problems 
v8: There is a limit to how many people of other races, 
religions or cultures a society can accept 
limits to 
multicultural 
society 
insistence on 
conformity of 
migrants to law 
resistance to 
multicultural 
society 
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Figure 2.3.2 Theoretical measurement model  
‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal 
migrants’ 
v13: Legally established immigrants from outside 
the European Union should have the same social 
rights as the (NATIONALITY) citizens
v14: Legally established immigrants from outside the 
European Union should have the right to bring 
members of their immediate family in (OUR 
COUNTRY) 
v18: Legally established immigrants from outside the 
European Union should be able to become 
naturalised easily 
v16: Legally established immigrants from outside the 
European Union should be sent back to their country 
of origin if they are unemployed
v17: Legally established immigrants from outside the 
European Union should all be sent back to their 
country of origin 
opposition to civil 
rights for legal 
migrants 
favour repatriation 
policies 
for legal migrants 
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In this section, we test whether the items presented in figures 3.1 and 3.2 can indeed be 
applied as valid and reliable measurements across countries. We test this by means of 
structural equation modelling (Jöreskog, 1977; Jöreskog, 1993), applying the LISREL 
computer programme, as developed by Jöreskog and Sörbom (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a, 
1993b). The measurement sub model of a full structural equation model describes the 
causal links between the unobserved theoretical concepts or latent variables and the 
observed or manifest variables. Whether, and to what extent, the applied indicators indeed 
refer to the same theoretical concept (or dimension thereof) can be examined by means of 
the measurement model. 
An important question in international comparative survey research is the degree of 
comparability of the measurement instrument: Is it possible to construct an international 
comparable measurement of exclusionist attitudes? If it can be demonstrated that theoretical 
concepts are measured in a quite comparable or equivalent manner in different countries, 
then we have a basis for valid cross-national comparisons. By means of multi-sample 
analysis, that is, the simultaneous analysis of independent random samples from several 
populations (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a), it is possible to empirically test the equivalence 
of the measurement instrument in the different countries, and to assess whether, and to what 
extent, the measurement instruments operate in a similar fashion in these different national 
settings. 
The causal relationships between latent and manifest variables are modelled in 
measurement equations, generally denoted as (cf. Bollen, 1989):  
xq = λq1ξ1 + λq2ξ2 + ... + δq (with q = 1, 2, .., the number of manifest variables x). 
 
The entire set of measurement equations for all manifest variables written in matrix 
notation is:  
x = Λx ξ + δ 
 
Consequently, the covariance matrix of observed variables (Σ) is defined as: 
Σ = ΛxΦΛx’ + Θδ 
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The terms in the measurement model are defined as follows: 
 
Variables:  x is a q x 1 vector of observed indicators of ξ 
   ξ is a n x 1 vector of latent variables (common factors) 
δ is a q x 1 vector of measurement errors (unique factors)  
 of x 
Coefficients:  Λx is a q x n matrix of coefficients (factor loadings) of the  
    regression of x on ξ  
Covariance matrices: Φ is a n x n covariance matrix of ξ 
   Θδ is a q x q covariance matrix of δ 
 
The parameters in Λx (lambda x), Φ(phi), and Θδ (theta-delta) can either be fixed, 
constrained, or freed. That is, parameters can either be given specified values (i.e. fixed), or 
parameters can be constrained to be equal to one or more other unknown parameters. Free 
parameters are neither fixed nor constrained. The scale indeterminacy of the latent variables 
is eliminated by giving the latent variable the scale of one of the observed variables (i.e. 
fixing a factor loading to one). 
To take into account the dichotomous scale scores of the measurement items, we analysed 
the matrix of polychoric correlations with the Generally Weighted Least Squares method 
with a Correct Weight matrix (Jöreskog, 1990). In this approach, for each variable x, it is 
assumed that there is an underlying continuous variable x* that is standard normally 
distributed. The polychoric correlations are the theoretical correlations of the underlying 
x*-variables (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993b).  
The fit of the measurement model is assessed by means of the Chi-square statistic. This 
statistic can be used for a goodness-of-fit test of the model against the alternative model 
that the covariance matrix of the observed variables is unconstrained. However, such a test 
is only justified if all the model assumptions are satisfied, if the sample size is sufficiently 
large, and if the model holds exactly in the population. Consequently, Jöreskog and Sörbom 
(1993a, p. 122) suggested that in practice it is more useful to regard the Chi-square statistic 
as a measure of fit rather than as a formal test statistic. In this view, the Chi-square statistic 
is a measure of the overall ‘badness-of-fit’ of the model to the data; the larger the Chi-
square value, the worse the fit of the model. 
Based on the aforementioned notions, we therefore preferred not to search for a 
measurement model with a ‘perfect’ fit (i.e. a non-significant Chi-square value), but instead 
to start with a model without correlated error terms, and to examine whether such a model 
has an acceptable model fit, as indicated by several fit indexes. In addition to the Chi-
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square statistic, we assessed the fit of the measurement model applying other goodness-of-
fit measures such as GFI and RMSEA.1  
As stated in the previous section, we started the search for an internationally comparable 
measurement instrument of ethnic exclusionism with an original pool of items. Each item is 
assumed to indicate one and only one theoretical variable. To select the best cross-
nationally equivalent indicators for nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism we 
applied the following procedures and criteria. Step-by-step, we excluded indicators that 
were less suitable, as judged by the goodness-of-fit of the LISREL model and a detailed 
examination of the parameter estimates. That is, we subsequently removed items that were 
hardly affected by the latent variable, as shown by a low explained item-variance (R² < .20 
on average in the samples), indicating that this item cannot be regarded as a reliable 
indicator for the proposed (dimension of the) theoretical concept. However, before 
excluding such an item from further analyses, we checked whether the specific item should 
not in fact have been regarded as an indicator of a different (dimension of a) theoretical 
concept than the one we initially presumed. If this was the case, this is indicated by a 
considerable high modification index for a zero-element of the matrix of factor loadings, 
indicating that freeing and estimating this factor loading (i.e. allowing a relationship 
between the item and a different concept than the one originally proposed) will improve the 
fit of the model considerably. The modification indices for factor loading parameters were 
also examined in order to check whether items – on average in the different samples – 
referred to more than one latent variable, indicating that the specific item cannot be applied 
to discriminate between the different theoretical concepts (or dimensions thereof). In this 
manner, we selected a set of indicators that – on average in all the samples – can be 
regarded as valid, reliable, and one-dimensional indicators.  
Firstly, we assumed that the form of the measurement model is the same in the different 
countries.2 That is, the parameter matrices (Λx, Φ, and Θδ) of the measurement models in 
the different countries have the same dimensions (in other words, each model has the same 
numbers of observed and latent variables) and the same pattern of fixed and freed elements. 
Consequently, in this model, an observed variable is regarded as an indicator of the same 
theoretical construct in the different countries. Each observed variable is strictly one-
dimensional, referring to only one theoretical variable. Furthermore, following the 
theoretical expectations, the theoretical variables are allowed to covariate: the model 
therefore gives an oblique solution. In addition, the measurement errors of the observed 
variables are assumed not to be correlated with each other. With respect to comparability 
across different countries, the model only assumes comparability in model form, and not in 
parameter values: all non-fixed parameters are allowed to vary across countries. If we found 
problems for countries with respect to relatively bad fit, we decided to add country specific 
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error variance correlations or double loadings. For the double loadings we used the criterion 
that it should be at least .20 smaller than the loadings of the other indicators on the same 
phenomenon. 
The second model assumes not only an invariant model form, but also invariant 
relationships between indicators and theoretical variables, in other words, invariant factor 
loadings across countries. In this model, there are no cross-national differences with respect 
to the (relative) degree in which indicators refer to a theoretical variable.3 If this model is 
acceptable, it seems more likely that the same latent variables are tapped in the different 
countries (Williams & Thomson, 1986).  
We have to remark that the item-categories which are dichotomous (having only two 
categories: agree or not agree) creates some limits to statistical research. Though 
asymmetric measures are used which account thereof, minimal variation in answering 
patterns puts limits on distinguishing clearly between items and consequently, between 
theoretical phenomena. It was this lack of variation, which we believe is due to bad fit of 
LISREL analyses when testing models on all items (of the two different sets) 
simultaneously. Similarly to previous reports on measurement instruments based upon these 
sets of indicators (SORA 2000), we decided to test on distinction of factors within subsets 
of indicators. Hence, we tested the theoretically expected models as provided in figures 
2.3.1 and 2.3.2. 
60 REPORT 2 
 
 
3.1 Invariance in measurement models in EU member states 2003 
regarding measurements of ‘resistance to multicultural 
society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’, and 
‘limits to multicultural society’ 
 
Initially, we included an additional item (v4) to indicate the ‘insistence on conformity of 
migrants to law’. The item formulation read: “In order to be fully accepted members of 
(NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up their 
own culture”. However, in our analysis it turned out that this item not only referred to the 
dimension of ‘insistence on conformity’, but the item also loaded on other dimensions. 
Therefore the item could not be regarded as a valid one-dimensional indicator of ‘insistence 
on conformity’. When we dropped this item from the analyses we found a satisfactory 
RMSEA statistic of .032. Some Heywood cases forced us to fix the error variances of v1, 
v5 and v9 to .05, after which the RMSEA hardly changed (.031).4 
To test equivalence of the model across all countries, the multi-sample procedure has been 
followed. Tests provided satisfactory results, implying that in all member states of the EU, 
similar phenomena are measured with the six items: the presented model form in figure 
2.3.1 is equivalent across countries.5 Similarly, the statistics for invariance on factor 
loadings met the expectations. Nevertheless, we inspected deviations for specific countries. 
It turned out that the results for Northern-Ireland and Austria differed relatively strongly 
from other countries. Although for Northern-Ireland an argument for the relatively bad fit is 
the small number of cases, we traced for both countries the identification of the problem as 
provided by the modification indices. Freeing the correlation between the error variances of 
v3 and v9 improved particularly for Austria fit statistics, and an overall decrease of the 
RMSEA statistic to .041. Fit statistics remained somewhat problematic for Northern 
Ireland, but as the modification indices did not identify serious problems and given the 
small number of cases for this country (due to listwise deletion of missing values), we 
decided to leave the model as simply as possible for all countries.  
We can conclude that ‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of 
migrants to law’ and ‘limits to multicultural society’ can be equivalently measured in all 
countries by the same indicators. 
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Table A2.3.1  Invariance in measurement models of attitudes towards minorities: 
‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of 
migrants to law’ and ‘limits to multicultural society’ 
 RMSEA χ2 df GFI Problem 
identification: 
Problem 
solved by: 
Model A1: EU-wide 
 
.083 785.17 11 .9911 Bad fit for item v4 Leaving out 
v4 
Model A2 : EU-wide 
 
.032 63.00 6 .9992 Negative error 
variances (v1, v5, 
v9) 
Set error 
variances to 
value .05 
Model A3: EU-wide 
 
.031 70.56 9 .9991   
Multi-sample models   
Model A3  
form equivalence 
 
.045 262.38 122 1   
Model A3  
invariant factor 
loadings 
 
.045 373.36 171 2 Relative bad fit 
for Northern 
Ireland and 
Austria 
Covariance 
between error 
of item V3 
and V6 in 
both countries 
Model A3 
invariant factor 
loadings 
 
.041 332.15 169 2   
Note:  multi-sample analyses of 17 samples; Source: EB59.2 
1 GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to be larger than .99 for each 
sample except Austria and Northern Ireland. After including a covariance between the 
errors terms of item V3 and item V6, also for these countries GFI statistics increased to 
over .99. 
2 GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to be larger than .99 for each 
sample. 
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v1 
v3 
v6 
v5 
v9 
v8 
1.00 
1.16 
1.00 
1.26 
1.00 
0.82 
resistance to 
multicultural society
insistence on 
conformity of 
migrants to law 
limits to 
multicultural society
Model I Unstandardised measurement model of dimensions of attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities ‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to 
law’ and ‘limits to multicultural society’
δ 
δ 
δ 
δ 
δ 
δ 
Standard Eurobarometers 1997-2000-2003 63 
 
 
3.2 Invariance in measurement models in EU member states 2003 
regarding measurements of ‘opposition to civil rights for legal 
migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’ 
 
The procedure to test invariance of the measurement model among countries of set 2 has 
been comparable to the one described for set 1. Initially, we included two additional items 
regarding illegal immigrants (v19 “All illegal immigrants should be sent back to their 
country of origin without exception” and v20 “Employers who hire illegal workers should 
be punished more severely”). However, it turned out that these two additional items could 
not be regarded as a valid and cross-national comparable measurement of the attitude 
regarding illegals. The question wording of v19 refers to ‘illegals’ as well as ‘send back’ 
and therefore formed a double loading on both the dimension of ‘opposition towards 
illegals’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’. The remaining item measuring 
‘opposition towards illegals’ (v20) was in most countries so differently related to the other 
items and measures punishment attitudes towards employers rather than an attitude towards 
illegals that we decided to leave the items v19 and v20 out the analyses.  
The remaining phenomena of ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour 
repatriation policies for legal migrants’ turned out to be two distinguishable concepts. Over 
all countries from the Standard Eurobarometer (EB59.2) the fit statistics show satisfactory 
results. The multi-sample procedure showed however deviations particularly for Spain, and 
to a lesser extent for Greece. Statistics provided that we had to specify a correlation 
between error variances and a double loading for Spain (v17 on ‘opposition to civil rights 
for legal migrants’). This double loading was quite large, but met the criterion of a larger 
difference of .20 with the smallest loading of the other items on the same dimension. 
We can conclude that ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation 
policies for legal migrants’ can be equivalently measured in all countries by the same 
indicators. 
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Table A2.3.2 Invariance in measurement models of attitudes towards immigrants: 
‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation 
policies for legal migrants’ 
 RMSEA χ2 Df GFI Problem 
identification: 
Problem solved 
by: 
Model B1: EU-wide 
 
.042 76.56 4 .9988   
Multi-sample models   
Model B1 
form equivalence .058 204.82 68 1
Relative bad fit 
for Spain and 
Greece 
covariance 
between error 
terms of v14 
and v17 in both 
countries 
Model B1 
form equivalence  
 
.045 148.89 66 2
  
Model B1  
invariant factor loading .048 275.53 114 1
Relative bad fit 
for Spain 
cross-loading of 
v17 on ‘civil 
rights’ in Spain 
Model B1  
invariant factor loading 
 
.043 241.78 113 2
  
Note:  multi-sample analyses of 17 samples; Source: EB59.2 
1 GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to be larger than .99 for each 
sample except Spain. 
2 GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to be larger than .99. 
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Model 2 Unstandardised measurement model of dimensions of attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies 
for legal migrants’ 
v13
v14
v16
v18
v17
opposition to civil rights for 
legal migrants 
favour repatriation policies 
for legal migrants 
1.00 
0.98 
0.81 
1.00 
0.91 
δ 
δ 
δ 
δ 
δ 
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3.3 Sum indices of dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. 
 
The previous analyses were conducted among respondents without missing answers. 
Having assessed that these 11 items indeed form a cross-national comparable measurement 
for various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, we can now use this result to estimate 
missing answers of respondents. A missing score of a respondent on a particular item 
referring to ethnic exclusionism was replaced by a regression estimate based on the answers 
that this respondent had provided on the other items referring to ethnic exclusionism. 
However, this procedure was only followed if a respondent answered more than half of the 
items referring to ethnic exclusionism. Respondents with less valid answers were excluded 
from all analyses.  
After substitution of missing values, we computed summated indices for each dimension of 
ethnic exclusionism. The indices are recoded on a scale from 0 to 1. Throughout this report, 
these indices are applied to measure exclusionist stances. The mean score on these indices 
across all countries and per country are displayed in Appendix 6. Table A.2.3.3. displays 
the overall relationships between the indices of the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. 
 
Table A2.3.3 Relationships between dimensions of ethnic exclusionism  
 A B C D E 
Resistance to 
multicultural society (A) 
1.00     
Limits to multicultural 
society (B) 
.28 1.00    
Insistence on conformity 
of migrants to law (C) 
.06 .19 1.00   
Opposition to civil rights 
for legal migrants (D) 
.41 .26 .12 1.00  
Repatriation policies for 
legal migrants (E) 
.28 .29 .01 .32 1.00 
Note: EU-average. National samples were given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size: all 
countries were given a standard sample size of 1000, whereas Luxembourg and Northern Ireland 
were given a standard sample size of 600 and 300 respectively. 
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The strongest relationship exists between ‘resistance to multicultural society’ and 
‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’. The more people oppose to cultural, ethnic 
and religious diversity as an enrichment for society as a whole, the stronger their opposition 
to granting civil rights to legal migrants. ‘Insistence on conformity’ has remarkable low 
correlations with the other dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. A vast majority of the EU 
population (67%) strongly insist that minorities conform to law, but this does not necessary 
imply that they share other exclusionist stances.  
68 REPORT 2 
 
 
3.4 Invariance in measurement models in EU member states over 
time, regarding measurements of ‘resistance to multicultural 
society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’, and 
‘limits to multicultural society’. 
 
The survey questions were also included in previous Eurobarometer surveys in 1997 
(eb47.1) and 2000 (eb53). For more information on the data collection of these surveys, we 
refer to the respective codebooks (Melich, 2000; Zentralarchiv für Empirische 
Sozialforschung, 2000). 
When comparing the responses over time, the question to be answered is whether 
measurements in 2003 (eb59.2) are equivalent in form and invariant in factor loadings 
compared to measurements in 2000 (eb53) and 1997 (eb49.1), in each of the countries. 
With multi-sample analyses, we tested for each country whether the phenomena are 
equivalently measured over time. The model as tested for 2003 (eb59.2) and presented in 
figure 3.1 is adjusted only to the extent that item v6 had to be dropped, as this measurement 
lacked in the surveys of 2000 and 1997.  
For 11 out of 17 samples, the measurement model turned out to be stable over time: it was 
equivalent in form and the factor loadings turned out to be invariant. For the other six 
samples, correlations between error variances or double loadings needed to be specified to 
meet the criteria. However, in none of these samples the violations were so severe that we 
had to construct another model form. The double loadings (specified for Spain, 
Luxembourg, East Germany and Austria) were at least .20 smaller than the smallest other 
loading on the concept. Hence, we can conclude that dimensions of ‘resistance to 
multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’ and ‘limits to 
multicultural society’ can be equivalently measured over time in all countries by the same 
indicators. 
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Table A2.3.4a Invariance in measurement models within countries over time (1997, 
2000, 2003) of attitudes towards immigrants: ‘resistance to 
multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’ 
and ‘limits to multicultural society’ 
 RMSEA 
Equivalent 
form 
RMSEA 
Invariant 
Factor loadings
RMSEA invariant factor 
loadings after accounting 
for identified misfit 
χ2 df 
Belgium .085 .070 .047 28.40 12 
Denmark .000 .000  8.68 13 
West Germany .033 .036  27.17 16 
Greece .051 .047  32.01 13 
Italy .040 .038  26.76 15 
Spain .046 .067 .044 29.29 15 
France .016 .000  11.25 13 
Ireland .044 .060 .045 29.61 15 
Northern Ireland .068 .045  21.57 16 
Luxembourg .100 .085 .034 20.62 15 
Netherlands .033 .045  35.70 15 
Portugal .000 .024  19.26 15 
Great Britain .055 .043  27.06 13 
East Germany .075 .066 .038 26.65 15 
Finland .023 .009  13.74 13 
Sweden .052 .050  36.60 14 
Austria .093 .085 .050 27.81 12 
Note: multi-sample analyses of 3 samples over time in each country; Source: EB49.1, EB52 and 
EB49.1 
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Table A.2.3.4b Identification of problems of the models in Table A2.3.4a according to 
Modification Indices and adjustments until RMSEA criterion is met 
 Problems 
Belgium covariance between error terms of: 
v5 and v8 in 1997 
v1 and v8 in 2000 
v3 and v9 in 2000 
Spain cross-loading of v8 on ‘resistance’ in 1997 
cross-loading of v1 on ‘insistence’ in 2000 
Ireland covariance between error terms of: v1 and v9 in 2000 
Luxembourg covariance between error terms of:  v1 and v9 in 1997 
cross-loading of v8 on ‘resistance’ in 2000 
East Germany cross-loading of v8 on ‘insistence’ 
Austria cross-loading of v9 on ‘resistance’ in 1997 
cross-loading of v8 on ‘resistance’ in 2000 
cross-loading of v9 on ‘insistence’ in 1997 
cross-loading of v1 on ‘insistence’ in 2000 
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3.5 Invariance in measurement models in EU member states over 
time, regarding measurements of ‘opposition to civil rights for 
legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal 
migrants’ 
 
Also for set 2 we need to answer the question whether measurements in 2003 (eb59.2) are 
equivalent in form and invariant in factor loadings compared to measurements in 2000 
(eb53) and 1997 (eb49.1), in each of the countries. With multi-sample analyses, we tested 
for each country whether the concepts of model 2 (‘oppositions towards civil rights’ and 
‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’) are equivalently and invariantly measured 
over time. 
For 9 out of 17 samples, the measurement model turned out to be equivalent over time and 
the factor loadings turned out to be invariant. For the other samples, correlations between 
error variances or double loaders needed to be specified, to meet the criteria. However, in 
none of these samples the violations were so severe that we had to construct another model 
form. The double loadings (specified for Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Finland and Austria) were at least .20 smaller than the smallest other loading on the 
concept.  
Hence, we can conclude that ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour 
repatriation policies for legal migrants’ can be equivalently measured over time in all 
countries by the same indicators. 
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Table A2.3.5a  Invariance in measurement models within countries over time (1997, 
2000, 2003) of attitudes towards immigrants: ‘opposition to civil rights 
for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’ 
 RMSEA 
Equivalent 
form 
RMSEA 
Invariant  
factor loadings
RMSEA Invariant factor 
loadings after accounting 
for identified misfit 
χ2 df 
Belgium .012 .028  28.52 19
Denmark .072 .063 .043 47.29 17
West Germany .037 .035  30.34 18
Greece .056 .049  40.59 15
Italy .068 .054 .049 41.99 17
Spain .051 .050  35.73 14
France .058 .050  48.99 18
Ireland .065 .060 .044 32.25 17
Northern 
Ireland 
.000 .034  21.23 18
Luxembourg .012 .033  24.06 18
Netherlands .086 .076 .041 37.54 17
Portugal .099 .092 .051 (close fit) 38.15 15
Great Britain .040 .037  32.15 18
East Germany .057 .054 .038 31.13 17
Finland .051 .064 .050 47.29 17
Sweden .026 .028  26.87 18
Austria .060 .053 .037 28.76 16
Note: multi-sample analyses of 3 samples in each country; Source: EB49.1, EB52 and EB49.1 
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Table A2.3.5b  Identification of problems in Table A2.3.5a according Modification 
Indices and adjustments until RMSEA criterion is met 
 Problem 
Denmark covariance between error terms of: 
v13 and v17 in 2000 
cross-loading of v17 on ‘civil rights’ in 1997 
cross-loading of v17 on ‘civil rights’ in 2000 
cross-loading of v18 on ‘repatriation’in 2000 
Italy covariance between error terms of:  
v17 and v18 in 2000 
Ireland covariance between error terms of:  
v14 and v16 in 2003 
cross-loading of v14 on ‘repatriation’in 2000 
Netherlands cross-loading of v13 on ‘repatriation’in 2000  
cross-loading of v13 on ‘repatriation’in 2003 
Portugal covariance between error terms of:  
v14 and v16 in 2000 
cross-loading of v13 on ‘repatriation’in 1997 
cross-loading of v17 on ‘civil rights’ in 2000 
East Germany covariance between error terms of:  
v13 and v17 in 2000 
Finland cross-loading of v18 on ‘repatriation’in 2000 
Austria cross-loading of v13 on ‘repatriation’in 1997  
cross-loading of v13 on ‘repatriation’in 2003 
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3.6 Overview of survey questions 
 
The Eurobarometer Survey 59.2 (2003) contained the following questions regarding 
minorities and immigrants. 
“Now we can talk about the place of people belonging to minority groups in terms of race, 
religion and culture within (NATIONALITY) society. For each of the following opinions, 
could you please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?” (Answer 
categories Tend to agree / Tend to disagree / Don’t know) 
V1 It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, 
religions or cultures 
V2   (COUNTRY) has always consisted of various cultural or religious groups 
V3   (COUNTRY)'s diversity in terms of race, religion or culture adds to its strengths 
V4   In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people 
belonging to these minority groups must give up their own culture 
V5   In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people 
belonging to these minority groups must give up such parts of their religion or 
culture which may be in conflict with (NATIONALITY) law 
V6   In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people 
belonging to minority groups must give up religious or cultural practices such as 
polygamy or female circumcision 
V7   In two or three generations' time, people belonging to these minority groups will be 
like all other members of society 
V8   There is a limit to how many people of other races, religions or cultures a society 
can accept 
V9   (OUR COUNTRY) has reached its limits; if there were to be more people belonging 
to these minority groups we would have problems 
V10  Not everybody belonging to these minority groups wants to be a full member of 
(NATIONALITY) society 
V11  Whether people belonging to these minority groups can be fully accepted members 
of (NATIONALITY) society depends on which group they belong to 
V12  People belonging to these minority groups are so different, they can never be fully 
accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society 
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“For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to 
disagree?” (Answer categories Tend to agree / Tend to disagree / Don’t know) 
V13   Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the 
same social rights as the (NATIONALITY) citizens 
V14   Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the 
right to bring members of their immediate family in (OUR COUNTRY) 
V15  Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be sent 
back to their country of origin if they have been convicted of serious offences 
V16   Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be sent 
back to their country of origin if they are unemployed  
V17   Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should all be sent 
back to their country of origin 
V18   Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be able to 
become naturalised easily 
V19   All illegal immigrants should be sent back to their country of origin without 
exception 
V20   Employers who hire illegal workers should be punished more severely 
V21   As regards illegal immigrants, whether they are allowed to stay in (OUR 
COUNTRY) should always depend on their personal circumstances 
V22   All immigrants, whether legal or illegal, and their children, even those who were 
born in (OUR COUNTRY), should be sent back to their country of origin 
V23   The right to asylum in (OUR COUNTRY) should be easier to obtain 
 
We constructed indices of dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, based on eleven of these 
items. The other items were excluded from our analyses due to lack of validity and 
reliability or because they cannot be regarded as a cross-national comparable indicator.  
  
An attitude, by definition, contains an evaluative component. However, some of the items 
lack a clear positive or negative evaluation of minorities or migrants (v2 and v7), and (also) 
refer to factual circumstances (v2) or expectations (v7). Furthermore, some item 
formulations (v7, v11, v21) are cognitively complex and may be sensitive for multiple 
interpretations. These doubts regarding the validity were supported by low correlations of 
the specific items with the others indicators. Item v22 is not applicable because it refers to 
both legal as well as illegal migrants, whereas there is a strong difference in people’s 
opinions of legal versus illegal migrants.  
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Other items that – regarding face validity – might refer to the same dimension as some 
other items had to be excluded since they did not strongly correlate with the other indicators 
of that dimension. As our goal was to construct multi-item indices in order to increase 
reliability of our measurements, we had to exclude some single items that were not strongly 
related to any of the other indicators. Finally, based on the results of previous analyses, we 
had to exclude some additional items. As described in section 3.1, item v4 could not be 
regarded as a valid one-dimensional indicator of ‘insistence on conformity’ and was 
therefore excluded. In section 3.2 we explicated that items v19 and v20 could not be 
regarded as a valid and cross-national comparable measurement of the attitude regarding 
illegals. 
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Appendix 4. Measurements of independent variables at 
the individual level 
 
In this study we focus on the attitudes of the ethnic majority population in various countries 
toward migrants and ethnic minorities. In order to select respondents from the majority 
populations, we restricted our analyses to citizens with the nationality of the country of 
residence. 
To measure the first of our independent variables, educational attainment, we used 
information on the age at which respondents had stopped their full-time education. In the 
descriptive analyses, we distinguished five ordinal categories, ranging from the lowest 
category ‘education stopped at age 6 to age 14’ to the highest category ‘education stopped 
at age 22 or later’ and an additional category consisting of respondents who were still 
studying at the time of survey. In the explanatory analyses, we regarded educational 
attainment as an interval variable. In order to assign a numerical value for the respondents 
who were still studying at the time of survey, we took their age. Furthermore, to prevent 
extreme high scores on the educational attainment variable, we regarded the age of 30 as an 
upper-limit.  
A measure of social class was constructed, using the available information in these 
secondary data, to resemble the cross-national comparable categorisation of Erickson, 
Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1983). We distinguished a number of categories, based on 
their actual social position in the labour force: the higher professionals (including 
professionals, business proprietors and top management); the lower professionals (middle 
management); routine non-manuals workers (people with an employed position at a desk, in 
service jobs or travelling); self-employed people (farmers, fishermen and shop owners); 
supervisors and skilled manual workers; and a category of other (unskilled) manual workers 
and servants. To these classes we added as distinct categories the people who were 
momentarily not active in the labour force: people working in their own household; 
students; unemployed people; and lastly, retired people and disabled people. 
Gross monthly household income was measured with a country-specific question so that the 
number and range of the income categories varied over countries. To enable cross-national 
comparisons, we took the mid-value of each separate income category and divided the 
income by the mean income of the specific country concerned. Furthermore, missing values 
for household income were – for each country separately – imputed by an estimated value 
based on other information that is available for the respondents. We estimated missing 
income values by means of a regression analysis of household income on four variables that 
are related to household income.6  
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Urbanisation was measured by means of three categories ranging from ‘a rural area or 
village’ or ‘a small or middle sized town’ to ‘a large town’, as judged by the respondent. In 
the Standard Eurobarometer dataset no information was available regarding religious 
denominations and church attendance. Political self-placement was measured by asking 
respondents to place their own political viewpoints on a ten point scale, ranging from left 
(score 1) to right (score 10). Finally, we include gender and age as variables in the analysis. 
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Appendix 5. Measurements of independent variables at 
the contextual level 
 
Individuals, as social beings, are affected by their surrounding social contexts. In this report 
we focus on the impact of the national context on individual attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities and immigrants. In order to explain cross-national differences in ethnic 
exclusionism, we searched for appropriate operationalisations and measurements of 
national contextual characteristics. However, one should be cautious when comparing 
national statistics. The comparability of national statistics can be problematic, due to cross-
national differences in applied definitions, modes of registration and classification. 
Furthermore, there can be sizeable differences in the reliability of national statistics 
between countries. In order to minimise these problems of comparability, contextual data 
are primarily derived from internationally recognised organisations, such as Eurostat, the 
United Nations Population Division and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees. The statistical departments of these international organisations have put a lot of 
effort in the standardisation of definitions and data collection methods in order to improve 
consistency and comparability of indicators across countries. 
In the Standard Eurobarometer sampling design, separate samples were drawn for West and 
East Germany and within the United Kingdom separate samples were drawn for Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. We analysed the German data separately for (former) West 
and East Germany, due to the large differences in political and economic developments that 
took place after the Second World War, as well as the vast differences in economic and 
demographic circumstances that still exist between East and West Germany today. 
Similarly, data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland are analysed separately. Hence, East 
and West Germany, Great Britain and Northern Ireland are all regarded as separate 
‘national’ contexts. However, some contextual variables, such as the number of asylum 
applications, are by definition only defined for Germany or the United Kingdom as a whole. 
The national statistical data for the countries included in the Standard Eurobarometer are 
displayed in table A2.5.1. Figures on the unemployment rate in 2002 were taken from 
Eurostat (2003a) and they refer to the number of unemployed persons as a share of the total 
active population. The estimates of the number of unemployed are based on the results of 
the European Union Labour Force Survey. Unemployed persons are those aged 15 to 74 
years not living in collective households who were without work within the two weeks 
following the reference week and have actively sought employment at some time during the 
previous four weeks or who found a job to start within a period of at most three months. We 
applied the unemployment rate in 2002, since this is the latest available annual figure on the 
unemployment rate. 
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We applied data from the German national statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt) to 
derive the unemployment rate in (former) West and East Germany. The unemployment rate 
for Germany as a whole, as reported by Eurostat (2003a), was adjusted for the ratio in 
unemployment rates in West Germany and East Germany, as reported by the Statistisches 
Bundesamt (2003a). Likewise, the unemployment rate for the United Kingdom, as reported 
by Eurostat (2003a), was adjusted for the ratio in unemployment rates in Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, as reported by the Office for National Statistics (2002).  
Figures on Gross Domestic Product were taken from Eurostat (2003b). GDP is measured 
per head in thousands of PPS (Purchasing Power Standards) at current prices, indexed at 
100 for the 15 EU members, in the year 2002. These relative figures are multiplied with the 
actual GDP per head in thousands for the EU (Eurostat 2003c) to derive the actual GDP for 
each country. The German figure was adjusted for East Germany and West Germany by the 
GDP ratio for the regions as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt (2003b). Similarly, the 
GDP for the United Kingdom was adjusted for the GDP ratio in Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland as reported by the Office for National Statistics (2003a), based on figures of 1999. 
As a measurement of the presence of ethnic minorities in a country, we took the number of 
non-nationals with a non-Western citizenship as a percentage of the total population and 
accounted for the number of naturalisations in the last 15 years. The latest available figures 
from Eurostat (2003d) refer to January 1, 2000. In this measurement, non-nationals with a 
citizenship of Western industrialised countries are not taken into account. That is, non-
nationals with a citizenship from one of the European Union countries, the European Free 
Trade Association countries, or the United States, Canada, Australia or New-Zealand are 
excluded from the total number of non-nationals. For Austria and Luxembourg, the figures 
refer to the percentage of non-EU nationals. We derived separate figures for former West 
and East Germany based on the figure for reunified Germany, as reported by Eurostat, and 
the ratio of the percentage of foreigners in former West and East Germany, as reported by 
the Statistisches Bundesamt (2003c). Similarly, separate figures for Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland were derived by adjusting the figure for the United Kingdom with the ratio 
of ethnic minority groups in the UK and the respective regions, as found in the UK Census 
of April 2001 (Office for National Statistics, 2003). As in some countries the number of 
naturalisations is much larger than in others – particularly in Sweden, Belgium and the 
Netherlands (Eurostat 2003d; OECD 2004) – and most naturalisations are applied to non-
Western citizens (OECD 2004), we included these numbers of naturalisations in our 
measurement of non-nationals with a non-Western citizenship. For Greece, the statistics on 
the number of non-nationals provided by Eurostat from 1998 turned out to deviate strongly 
form the latest Greek Census data (2001). Therefore, we decided to take into account the 
latter statistics. The Greek Census results report the number of inhabitants by citizenship to 
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which we added the number of naturalisations as reported by Eurostat (General Secretariat 
of National Statistical Services of Greece 2004; Eurostat 2003d). 
To take into account the effect of immigration on ethnic exclusionism, we took the average 
annual number of migrants and related it to the total population. A distinction could be 
made between immigration of nationals, other EU-nationals and non-EU nationals. As a 
measurement of foreign immigration, we applied the figures regarding the number of non-
EU immigrants. To adjust for strong yearly fluctuations, we took the average annual 
immigration of non-EU nationals in 1995 to 1999 as registered by Eurostat (2003d). To 
compare the burden of the absolute numbers of immigrants across countries, we related 
these figures to the size of the total population in order to derive the average annual 
immigration of non-EU nationals in 1995 to 1999 per 1,000 capita. 
Finally, we took the average number of asylum applications in 2001 and 2002 per 1,000 
capita as an additional indicator. Figures regarding the number of asylum applications are 
quite suitable for international comparison as compared to other figures on asylum seekers, 
such as the number of admitted refugees. It is much more complicated to produce 
comparable figures regarding the number of admitted refugees, due to cross-national 
differences in legal regulations, residence permits (e.g. provisional versus durable permits), 
as well as differences in registration, classification and political circumstances in general. 
The number of asylum applications in each country is registered by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (2002, 2003). To take into account strong yearly 
fluctuations, we took the average number of asylum applications in the two years preceding 
the time of survey, that is in 2001 and 2002. To compare the burden of the absolute 
numbers of asylum applications across countries, we related this to the size of the total 
population as derived from Eurostat (2003d).  
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Table A2.5.1  Contextual characteristics of EU Member States  
Country Unemploy
ment rate 
in 2002a 
GDP per 
capita in 
2002b 
Non-
Western  
non-
nationals in 
percentage of 
population in 
2000c 
Average annual 
immigration of 
non-EU 
nationals in 
1995-1999, per 
1,000 capitad 
Average annual 
number of 
asylum 
applications in 
2001 and 2002,  
per 1,000 capitae 
Finland 9.1 24.79 1.7 1.25 0.49 
Sweden 4.9 24.50 7.7 2.92 3.18 
Denmark 4.5 27.48 4.9j 4.48 1.73 
Great Britain 5.1f 24.77h 3.4k 2.28 1.89 
Northern Ireland 7.4f 19.20h 0.3k 2.28 1.89 
Ireland 4.4 30.12 1.1l 1.98 3.53 
Netherlands 2.7 27.05 6.6 3.70 1.60 
Belgium 7.3 25.97 6.2 2.45 2.28 
Luxembourg 2.8 45.46 12.0j 6.09 1.95 
Germany West 6.5g 26.50i 8.5m 7.69 1.09 
Germany East 15.2g 16.45i 3.6m 3.01 1.09 
Austria 4.3 26.90 10.2n 6.26 4.27 
France 8.8 24.65 5.0j 0.99 1.11 
Spain  11.3 20.23 1.5 0.76 0.20 
Portugal 5.1 16.49 1.3 0.38 0.02 
Italy 9.0 24.55 2.0o 2.10 0.15 
Greece 10.0 15.82 6.7p 1.47 0.53 
a Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population. Source: Eurostat (2003a).  
b GDP per capita in purchasing power standards. Source: Eurostat (2003a).  
c Non-nationals with a non-Western citizenship and the number of naturalisations between 
1995 and 1999 as percentage of total population on January 1, 2000. Only non-nationals 
with a non-Western citizenship are displayed: non-nationals with a citizenship from one of 
the European Union countries, the European Free Trade Association countries, or the 
United States, Canada, Australia or New-Zealand are not taken into account. Figures for 
Luxembourg and Austria refer to non-EU nationals. Source: Eurostat (2003b). 
d Source: Eurostat (2003b). 
e Source for asylum application figures: UNHCR (2002, 2003). Total population on 
January, 1, 2001 and 2002 derived from Eurostat (2003b).  
f Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Office for National Statistics (2002). 
g Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003a). 
h Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Office for National Statistics (2003a). 
i Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003b). 
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j Data January 1, 1999 
k Data spring 1998. Source: Eurostat (2003b) and Office for National Statistics (2003). 
l Data April 1999 
m Source: Eurostat (2003b) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003). 
n Data on naturalisation for 1995 and for 1999 imputed by average of 1996 to 1998 
o Data on naturalisation for 1995 to 1999 taken from OECD (2004) Trends in International 
Migration. 
p Data January 1, 2001, Greek census data; data on naturalisation for 1995 and for 1999 
imputed by average of 1996 to 1998 
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Appendix 6. Grand means, means per country and 
percentages of support for exclusionist stances 
 
Table A2.6.1 Mean score and percentage support on ‘resistance to multicultural 
society’ and ‘limits to multicultural society’ per country.  
 resistance to multicultural 
society 
limits to multicultural 
society 
Country Mean a % support b Mean a % support b N
Finland 0.322 23.5 0.319 21.6 981
Sweden 0.288 12.5 0.509 40.7 971
Denmark 0.301 22.3 0.660 55.4 976
Great Britain 0.305 20.3 0.759 68.1 950
Northern Ireland 0.261 7.1 0.627 48.4 292
Ireland 0.257 16.9 0.805 72.1 923
Netherlands 0.334 21.6 0.778 67.5 968
Belgium 0.480 37.3 0.781 69.2 926
Luxembourg 0.274 16.2 0.739 63.0 448
Germany West 0.443 32.6 0.813 71.5 960
Germany East 0.487 36.2 0.825 74.6 939
Austria 0.391 27.0 0.742 61.3 944
France 0.317 22.2 0.733 64.1 1011
Spain 0.263 14.6 0.625 49.3 926
Portugal 0.324 18.2 0.734 59.2 959
Italy 0.370 23.9 0.570 45.5 970
Greece 0.698 59.0 0.878 80.6 974
EU member states c 0.366 25.2 0.702 59.9 15118
EU member states d 0.363 24.9 0.713 61.2 15118
a Based on a three-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.  
b To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been 
dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates support, and each value 
on or below the middle range value indicates a low score. 
c To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except Luxembourg 
and Northern Ireland) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, 
all countries were given a standard sample size of 1000, whereas Luxembourg and Northern 
Ireland were given a standard sample size of 600 and 300 respectively. 
d To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to 
their population size. 
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Table A2.6.2  Mean score and percentage support on ‘opposition to civil rights for 
legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’ per 
country.  
 opposition to civil rights for 
legal migrants 
favour repatriation policies 
for legal migrants 
 
Country Mean a % support b Mean c % support b N 
Finland 0.423 41.5 0.176 8.8 981 
Sweden 0.381 33.5 0.143 7.8 971 
Denmark 0.436 41.4 0.123 6.7 976 
Great Britain 0.490 48.5 0.380 27.7 950 
Northern Ireland 0.288 24.5 0.290 20.0 292 
Ireland 0.325 30.7 0.410 29.5 923 
Netherlands 0.441 43.4 0.315 19.9 968 
Belgium 0.545 54.9 0.361 26.2 926 
Luxembourg 0.390 37.3 0.347 15.4 448 
Germany West 0.533 51.8 0.416 28.8 960 
Germany East 0.478 46.4 0.432 32.6 939 
Austria 0.454 44.3 0.437 29.0 944 
France 0.419 40.5 0.388 22.9 1011 
Spain 0.289 25.0 0.391 21.9 926 
Portugal 0.318 26.0 0.437 23.7 959 
Italy 0.304 24.8 0.391 19.1 970 
Greece 0.343 32.5 0.507 31.5 974 
EU member states d 0.409 38.7 0.352 22.1 15118 
EU member states e 0.418 39.4 0.384 24.0 15118 
a Based on a four-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.  
b To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been 
dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates support, and each value 
on or below the middle range value indicates a low score. 
c Based on a three-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.  
d To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except Luxembourg 
and Northern Ireland) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, 
all countries were given a standard sample size of 1000, whereas Luxembourg and Northern 
Ireland were given a standard sample size of 600 and 300 respectively. 
e To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to 
their population size. 
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Table A2.6.3  Mean score and percentage support on ‘insistence on conformity of 
migrants to laws and conventions’ per country.  
 insistence on conformity of migrants  
Country Mean a % support b N 
Finland 0.856 76.1 981
Sweden 0.908 85.4 971
Denmark 0.923 86.1 976
Great Britain 0.786 69.9 950
Northern Ireland 0.669 54.5 292
Ireland 0.725 62.4 923
Netherlands 0.858 77.3 968
Belgium 0.835 76.1 926
Luxembourg 0.724 57.7 448
Germany West 0.812 70.0 960
Germany East 0.860 76.6 939
Austria 0.772 65.5 944
France 0.800 70.2 1011
Spain 0.788 70.5 926
Portugal 0.718 59.1 959
Italy 0.529 27.5 970
Greece 0.578 46.8 974
EU member states c 0.779 67.3 15118
EU member states d 0.756 63.5 15118
a Based on a three-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.  
b To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been 
dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates support, and each value 
on or below the middle range value indicates a low score. 
c To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except Luxembourg 
and Northern Ireland) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, 
all countries were given a standard sample size of 1000, whereas Luxembourg and Northern 
Ireland were given a standard sample size of 600 and 300 respectively. 
d To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to 
their population size. 
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Appendix 7: Test for significant over time changes 
within countries 
 
Table A2.7.1. Changes in resistance to multicultural society 
Average EU-level 
 1997 2000 2003 
V1 It is a good thing for any society to be made up of 
people from different races, religions or cultures 
.264 .304 .303
V3 (COUNTRY)'s diversity in terms of race, religion or 
culture adds to its strengths 
.447 .457 .429
Index on Resistance to multicultural society .355 .381 .366
 
Changes in index per country  
 Year Difference 
 1997 2000 2003 1997-
2000 
2000-
2003 
1997-2003 
Finland .270 .355 .322 .085* -.033 .052* 
Sweden .314 .330 .288 .016  -.042* -.026 
Denmark .412 .318 .301 -.094* -.017 -.111* 
Great Britain .233 .311 .305 .077* -.005 .072* 
Northern Ireland .266 .255 .261 -.011 .036 .005 
Ireland .223 .374 .257 .151* -.117* .034 
Netherlands .286 .307 .334 .021 .026 .047* 
Belgium .552 .490 .480 -.062* -.010 -.073* 
Luxembourg .251 .370 .274 .118* -.096* .023 
Germany West .450 .474 .443 .024 -.031 -.007 
Germany East .458 .458 .487 .000 .029 .029 
Austria .404 .405 .391 .001 -.015 -.013 
France .301 .320 .317 .019 -.003 .016 
Spain .236 .270 .263 .034 -.007 .027 
Portugal .263 .294 .324 .031 .030 .061 
Italy .412 .374 .370 -.038 -.004 -.043* 
Greece .604 .673 .698 .069* .024 .093* 
EU (country 
average) 
.355 .381 .366 .026* -.015* .011* 
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Table A2.7. 2. Changes in limits to multicultural society 
Average EU-level 
 1997 2000 2003 
V8 There is a limit to how many people of other races, 
religions or cultures a society can accept 
.711 .742 .724 
V9 (OUR COUNTRY) has reached its limits; if there 
were to be more people belonging to these minority 
groups we would have problems 
.608 .624 .680 
Index on Limits to multicultural society .659 .683 .702 
 
Changes in index per country  
 Year Difference 
 1997 2000 2003 1997-
2000 
2000-
2003 
1997-
2003 
Finland .283 .310 .319 .027 .009 .036 
Sweden .653 .557 .509 -.096* -.048* -.144* 
Denmark .730 .699 .660 -.031 -.039* -.070* 
Great Britain .699 .752 .759 .053* .007 .060* 
Northern Ireland .475 .540 .627 .065 .087* .152* 
Ireland .579 .766 .805 .187* .039* .226* 
Netherlands .701 .790 .778 .089* -.012 .077* 
Belgium .810 .796 .781 -.014 -.015 -.029 
Luxembourg .697 .771 .739 .074* -.032 .042 
Germany West .821 .777 .813 -.044* .036* -.008 
Germany East .784 .847 .825 .063* -.022 .041* 
Austria .737 .704 .742 -.033 .038 .005 
France .717 .742 .733 .025 -.009 .016 
Spain .338 .423 .625 .085* .202* .287* 
Portugal .609 .619 .734 .010 .115* .125* 
Italy .607 .626 .570 .019 -.056* -.037 
Greece .857 .823 .878 -.034* .055* .021 
EU (country average) .659 .683 .702 .023* .019* 0.43* 
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Table A2.7.3 Changes in opposition to civil rights for legal migrants 
Average EU-level 
 1997 2000 2003 
V13 Legally established immigrants from outside the 
European Union should have the same social rights as 
the (NATIONALITY) citizens 
.303 .300 .359
V14 Legally established immigrants from outside the 
European Union should have the right to bring members 
of their immediate family in (OUR COUNTRY) 
.432 .476 .356
V18 Legally established immigrants from outside the 
European Union should be able to become naturalised 
easily 
.534 .551 .511
Index on Opposition to civil rights .423 .443 .409
 
Changes in index per country  
 Year Difference 
 1997 2000 2003 1997-
2000 
2000-
2003 
1997-
2003 
Finland .369 .364 .423 -.005 .059* .054* 
Sweden .483 .454 .381 -.029 -.075* -.102* 
Denmark .580 .541 .436 -.039* -.105* -.144* 
Great Britain .494 .553 .490 .059* -.063* -.004 
Northern Ireland .344 .334 .288 -.010 -.046 -.056 
Ireland .309 .344 .325 .035 -.019 .016 
Netherlands .470 .530 .441 .060* -.089* -.029 
Belgium .577 .580 .545 .003 -.035 -.032 
Luxembourg .422 .534 .390 .112* -.144* -.032 
Germany West .583 .547 .533 -.036 -.014 -.050* 
Germany East .513 .560 .478 .047* -.082* -.035 
Austria .489 .458 .454 -.031 -.004 -.035 
France .421 .466 .419 .045* -.047* -.002 
Spain .172 .177 .289 .005 .112* .117* 
Portugal .302 .336 .318 .034 -.018 .016 
Italy .335 .306 .304 -.029 -.002 -.031 
Greece .267 .399 .343 .132* -.056* .076* 
EU (country average) .423 .443 .409 .020 * -.034 * -.014 * 
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Table A2.7.4 Changes in favour repatriation policies for legal migrants 
Average EU-level 
 1997 2000 2003 
V16 Legally established immigrants from outside the 
European Union should be sent back to their country 
of origin if they are unemployed 
.388 .403 .435 
V17 Legally established immigrants from outside the 
European Union should all be sent back to their 
country of origin 
.198 .218 .270 
Index on In favour of repatriation policies .293 .311 .352 
 
Changes in index per country  
 Year Difference 
 1997 2000 2003 1997-2000 2000-2003 1997-2003 
Finland .154 .197 .176 .043* -.021 .022 
Sweden .148 .160 .143 .012 -.017 -.005 
Denmark .196 .107 .123 -.089* .016 -.073* 
Great Britain .255 .357 .380 .102* .023 .125* 
Northern Ireland .186 .240 .290 .054 .050 .104* 
Ireland .171 .254 .410 .083* .156* .239* 
Netherlands .180 .278 .315 .098* .037* .135* 
Belgium .431 .394 .361 -.037 -.033 -.070* 
Luxembourg .315 .414 .347 .099* -.067* .032 
Germany West .414 .403 .416 -.011 .013 .002 
Germany East .424 .388 .432 -.036 .044* .008 
Austria .405 .316 .437 -.089* .121* .032 
France .320 .349 .388 .029 .039* .068* 
Spain .223 .239 .391 .016 .152* .168* 
Portugal .368 .335 .437 -.033 .102* .069* 
Italy .384 .403 .391 .019 -.012 .007 
Greece .342 .441 .507 .099* .066* .165* 
EU (country average) .293 .311 .352 .018 * .042 * .059* 
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Table A2.7.5 Insistence on conformity to law 
(Since item v6 was not measured in 1997 and 2000, only item v5 was applied.) 
Average EU level 
 1997 2000 2003 
V5 In order to be fully accepted members of 
(NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these 
minority groups must give up such parts of their 
religion or culture which may be in conflict with 
(NATIONALITY) law 
.621 .675 .726 
 
Per country 
 Year Difference 
 1997 2000 2003 1997-2000 2000-2003 1997-2003 
Finland .710 .788 .798 .078* .010 .088* 
Sweden .871 .827 .878 -.044* .051* .007 
Denmark .897 .874 .874 -.023 .000 -.023 
Great 
Britain 
.683 .727 .787 .044* .060* .104* 
Northern 
Ireland 
.443 .541 .640 .098* .099* .197* 
Ireland .390 .518 .684 .128* .166* .294* 
Netherlands .806 .801 .839 -.005 .038 .033 
Belgium .730 .784 .806 .054* .022 .076* 
Luxembourg .630 .605 .649 -.025 .044 .019 
Germany 
West 
.656 .705 .737 .049* .032 .081* 
Germany 
East 
.626 .776 .803 .150* .027 .177* 
Austria .544 .610 .730 .066* .120* .186* 
France .747 .731 .735 -.016 .004 -.012 
Spain .304 .375 .770 .071* .395* .466* 
Portugal .545 .643 .648 .098* .005 .103* 
Italy .288 .377 .313 .089* -.064* .025 
Greece .571 .673 .555 .102* -.118* -.016 
EU (country 
average) 
.621 .675 .726 .054* .051*   .105* 
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Notes appendices 
 
1 We applied the goodness-of-fit measure GFI of Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993a). GFI is a normed 
statistics ranging from zero to one. As a rule-of-thumb, a minimum value for GFI of 0.90 has been 
proposed. Browne and Cudeck (Browne & Cudeck, 1992) proposed a fit measure that takes account 
of the error of approximation in the population. They suggested using Steiger’s Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) as a measure of the discrepancy (due to error of approximation) 
per degree of freedom. RMSEA will be zero only if the model fits exactly. It will decrease if 
parameters are added to the model that substantially reduce the discrepancy due to approximation. If, 
however, the additional parameters reduce the discrepancy only slightly, the RMSEA can increase. 
Based on practical experience, Browne and Cudeck suggested that a value of 0.05 or less indicates a 
close fit of the model in relation to the degrees of freedom, whereas values of 0.08 and lower indicate 
a reasonable error of approximation. 
2 As Bollen (1989, p. 356) pointed out, the comparability (or invariance) in models represents a 
continuum. He distinguished between two dimensions of comparability: model form and similarity in 
parameter values. Models for different samples have the same form if each model has the same 
parameter matrices with the same dimensions and the same location of fixed, free, and constrained 
parameters. The invariance in model form is a matter of degree. On the one hand, the invariance in 
model form can be rather low if models have very different numbers of latent variables or if observed 
variables load on different latent variables in different models. On the other hand, the invariance in 
model form is rather high if the model forms are identical except for the pattern of correlated 
measurement errors. Models can also differ with regard to the parameter values, from the one extreme 
where no parameters are equal across the populations under study, to the other extreme where all are 
invariant. 
3 Since only ratios of factor loadings are identified – and not factor loadings themselves – the model 
assumes invariance of factor loading ratios across countries. Invariance of all factor loadings across 
countries is not a testable assumption. However, if the assumption of invariant factor loading ratios is 
justified, then it is probably safe to assume invariance of the factor loadings themselves (Bielby, 
1986). 
4 In some instances, the programme may provide a negative variance estimate for the measurement 
error of a particular item. This situation is called a Heywood case (Boomsma & Hoogland, 2001). 
This anomaly can be solved by setting the specific error variance to a fixed value, for instance zero. 
Since fixation of error variances to zero would imply absence of measurement error, we prefer to set 
negative error variances to a value of .05 
5 Country specific fixations were allowed to control for Heywood cases. 
6 Based on the available information in the Standard Eurobarometer dataset, the following variables 
were  applied in the regression analysis of household income: ‘years of fulltime education’, ‘age’ 
(divided into six categories); ‘social class of the person in the household who contributes most to the 
household income’ and ‘marital status’ (with categories (i) married / remarried / unmarried, living 
with partner, (ii) unmarried, never had partner (iii) unmarried, previously had a partner (iv) 
divorced/separated and (v) widowed). A random normal deviate was added to this estimated income 
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value to prevent a drop in the standard deviation of the income variable. Finally, the range of the 
imputed income values was set equal to the original range of the income variable. 
